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  INTRODUCTION   
Thomas Steele pleaded guilty to rape and other charges in 
exchange for a sentence of twelve to thirty years in a Massa-
chusetts state prison.1 Shortly before he became eligible for pa-
role on this criminal conviction, the state classified Steele as a 
“sexually dangerous person.”2 Although Steele has completed 
his prison sentence, the state continues to confine him under a 
Massachusetts law that allows for the involuntary civil com-
mitment of “sexually dangerous persons.”3 The order commit-
ting him stated that he could be held for a period ranging from 
one day to life.4 
At the time of his guilty plea, Steele was presumably in-
formed that he would receive a twelve to thirty year prison sen-
tence. The constitutional principles governing guilty pleas and 
the right to counsel require a defendant to be advised of the 
criminal penalty that he faces.5 However, neither the sentenc-
ing court nor defense counsel in his criminal case was required 
 
 1. See Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 2. Telephone Interview by Peter Chambers with Willie J. Davis, Appel-
late Counsel for Thomas Steele, in Boston, Mass. (June 13, 2007). 
 3. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (1986), amended by 1999 Mass. Acts 
265–66. 
 4. Steele, 365 F.3d at 15. 
 5. Id. at 17. 
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to tell Steele about the potential lifetime involuntary commit-
ment at the time that he entered his guilty plea.6 
According to the First Circuit, “the possibility of commit-
ment for life as a sexually dangerous person is a collateral con-
sequence of pleading guilty.”7 The court reasoned that, even 
though the charges of aggravated rape, kidnapping and assault 
to which Steele pleaded guilty “perhaps made him a likely can-
didate for being classified a sexually dangerous person,” the 
consequence was properly categorized as collateral because it 
did not flow directly, immediately, and automatically from the 
fact of his guilty plea.8 As a result, the court rejected Steele’s 
argument that the failure to inform him prior to his guilty plea 
about the potential for involuntary commitment violated due 
process.9 
Direct consequences include the potential jail or prison 
term, fines, and any other criminal punishment that a trial 
judge may impose after conviction. Almost everything else is 
deemed “collateral.”10 Under the collateral-consequences rule, a 
defendant has no constitutional right to be made aware of such 
consequences before he pleads guilty.11 Consequently, he has no 
right to withdraw his guilty plea if he was unaware of its colla-
teral consequences.12 
The Steele case neatly illustrates the formalistic distinction 
the lower courts have drawn between direct and collateral con-
sequences. Courts decide which consequences are collateral 
based on a bright-line rule that focuses on the role of the insti-
tutions that impose the consequence.13 By strictly circumscrib-
ing the category of direct consequences, courts promote finality 
and efficiency in the plea bargain process. The fewer conse-
quences that a defendant must be aware of prior to a guilty 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
 8. Id. at 18. 
 9. See id. at 16–17 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). A 
Massachusetts law requires trial courts to “inform the defendant on the 
record, in open court: . . . of any different or additional punishment based 
upon . . . sexually dangerous persons provisions of the General Laws, if appli-
cable.” MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3)(B). However, the court in Steele noted that 
any violation of this state procedural rule “does not affect our analysis of 
Steele’s federal constitutional claim.” Steele, 365 F.3d at 18 n.2. 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See Steele, 365 F.3d at 17. 
 12. See id. at 16–17. 
 13. See id. at 17–18. 
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plea, the simpler and more efficient the plea process and the 
lesser the chance of a successful postconviction attack upon the 
guilty plea based on a failure to warn. 
This approach, however, completely ignores the defen-
dant’s right, and need, to know what he is truly getting himself 
into by waiving his constitutional rights to trial and to remain 
silent. As the Supreme Court has noted, “a guilty plea is a 
grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and dis-
cernment . . . .”14 When someone pleads guilty, he consents to a 
judgment of conviction without trial that will in most cases re-
main with him for the rest of his life.15 This consent “not only 
must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[] 
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances 
and likely consequences.”16 
Institutional concerns, although pervasive throughout the 
plea bargain jurisprudence and literature, are in tension with 
these critical constitutional values, which protect an individu-
al’s right to know what he is agreeing to when he pleads guilty 
and his right to competent assistance in making that important 
and complex decision. Professional standards and some crimi-
nal procedure codes now recommend or statutorily require 
warnings about at least some collateral consequences.17 The 
collateral-consequences rule, however, lags far behind those 
evolving norms. 
The unprincipled, outdated collateral-consequences rule 
has a far greater negative effect on defendants than it did at its 
inception and throughout its development over the last half 
century. The number and severity of collateral consequences, 
including increasing bars to employment and housing, have 
greatly expanded in recent years.18 Many of these consequences 
 
 14. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 15. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“[A] plea of guilty is 
more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.”). 
 16. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 17. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (listing nineteen 
state statutes and noting that “[m]any States . . . require that trial judges ad-
vise defendants that immigration consequences may result from accepting a 
plea agreement”). 
 18. See infra notes 155–156 and accompanying text; see also Kathleen M. 
Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National 
Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 11, 14–15 
(1996) (“[An] analysis of state legal codes reveals an increase between 1986 
and 1996 in the extent to which states restrict the rights of convicted fe-
lons. . . . [T]here was an increase in the number of states restricting six rights; 
voting, holding office, parenting, divorce, firearm ownership, and criminal reg-
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now apply to relatively minor criminal convictions, and even to 
certain noncriminal convictions. For example, two low-level 
state marijuana possession convictions, even if they are non-
criminal “offenses” under that state’s penal law, can lead to 
mandatory deportation.19 Perversely, because of the explosion 
of arrests and prosecutions for minor offenses over the last two 
decades, collateral consequences often far outweigh the direct 
penal sanction of a conviction.20 Since the vast majority of crim-
inal defendants plead guilty to resolve the criminal charges 
against them,21 and since there are collateral consequences for 
so many of those convictions, the right to information in the 
plea process has a broad impact.22 
It is time to revisit the rule. This Article proposes a rea-
sonableness standard in determining the duty to inform about 
consequences. Under this standard, courts must require warn-
ings whenever a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation 
would deem knowledge of the consequence, penal or otherwise, 
to be a significant factor in deciding whether to plead guilty. 
Whether a consequence is significant depends primarily on the 
severity of the consequence. If reasonable people would treat as 
significant a severe consequence when making a decision as se-
rious as a guilty plea, courts should require preplea warnings 
before concluding that the plea is “knowing.” A secondary factor 
in the “significance” inquiry would be the likelihood that the 
particular consequence would apply. Even if a consequence is 
not at the highest end of the severity scale, warnings would 
still be mandatory when the mere fact of the criminal convic-
tion makes it certain that the consequence would apply. It is 
 
istration increased.”). 
 19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 
(McKinney 2000) (making unlawful possession of marijuana a violation, which 
is a noncriminal offense). 
 20. See infra Part I.C. 
 21. See infra note 59 (discussing guilty plea statistics). 
 22. Cf. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incar-
cerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 633 (2006) (noting how 
“[c]ommunities . . . are broadly affected by the influx of returning individuals 
weighed down by the obstacles imposed by their criminal convictions long af-
ter their formal sentences have lapsed” and calling for “a unified voice that 
consistently articulates collateral consequences and reentry as interwoven and 
integrated components along the criminal justice continuum”). Although ad-
visement at the guilty plea stage is only one piece of this important effort to-
wards integration, it is a critical beginning to a long, difficult process. 
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reasonable to require warnings about the limited number of 
such automatically applicable consequences. 
This Article uses the lens of involuntary commitment of 
“sexually violent predators” to illustrate the flaws with the cur-
rent collateral-consequences rule and the virtues of applying a 
reasonableness standard. Laws allowing for involuntary com-
mitment of sex offenders are rapidly proliferating. Since 1990, 
at least twenty states have enacted “Sexually Violent Predator 
Acts” (SVPAs) specifically designed to commit individuals con-
victed of certain sexual offenses, and who also suffer from a 
“mental abnormality,” after they serve their prison term.23 Ad-
ditionally, on July 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed 
into law a bill that authorized the disbursement of federal 
grant money to states that establish involuntary commitment 
programs for sexually dangerous persons.24 While the number 
of individuals confined under an SVPA remains relatively 
small, the potential reach of such laws is broad.25 The Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, for example, is currently conducting a re-
view of all inmates to determine if they merit further consider-
ation for involuntary confinement under the federal SVPA.26 As 
one scholar noted, “[c]learly, SVPs are a growth industry.”27 
Involuntary commitment is perhaps the harshest collateral 
consequence.28 Nevertheless, the literature addressing the role 
 
 23. Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current 
Practices, Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
(forthcoming Winter 2008) (manuscript at 4–5, on file with author). Texas is 
the only state with an SVPA that is entirely outpatient. See TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon 2003). 
 24. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 301, 120 Stat. 587, 618–19 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
 26. See Memorandum from Amy Baron-Evans & Sara Noonan to Defend-
ers, CJA Counsel 4 (Sept. 10, 2007, as revised Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Adam.Walsh.III.REV.9.24.07.FINAL.pdf. 
 27. JOHN Q. LA FOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY 
SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS 145 (2005). 
 28. Despite the severe nature of involuntary commitment, the vast major-
ity of the significant and growing body of literature on collateral consequences 
examines the particular consequence of immigration, on the theory that “exile” 
is the harshest consequence. See, e.g., John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-
Citizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Should This Be 
Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 691, 734 (2003) 
(“[D]eportation is unlike other collateral consequence in its severity and cer-
tainty. . . . [Courts] should recognize it as a unique type of consequence.”); 
Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Re-
troactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent 
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of defense counsel, prosecutors, and the courts involved in the 
criminal convictions that can lead to collateral consequences 
largely fails to discuss it.29 Involuntary commitment is also 
overlooked in the various court, professional, and ethical rules 
that govern the guilty plea process.30 
Although SVPAs are relatively new, the issue of whether 
failure to warn a defendant invalidates a guilty plea to a crime 
covered under the law has been litigated in numerous state and 
some federal courts. The decision in Steele is not unique. With 
few exceptions, defendants who plead guilty in the SVPA states 
are found to have no constitutional right to be told about poten-
tial commitment under the SVPA prior to entering a guilty 
plea.31 Silence about this significant consequence during the 
plea bargaining, counseling, and colloquy process is deemed 
constitutionally permissible.32 
 
Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 861–62 (1998). Some commentators 
have focused on yet other types of consequences. See, e.g., Alicia Werning 
Truman, Note, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should Be Warned 
Others Could Lose Public Housing if They Plead Guilty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1753, 
1755 (2004) (focusing on the consequence of eviction based on a drug convic-
tion).  
 29. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and 
the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1250–51 (2004) 
(addressing economic and constitutional effects of commitment); Wanda D. 
Kendall & Monit Cheung, Sexually Violent Predators and Civil Commitment 
Laws, 13 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 41, 53–55 (2004) (discussing the costs and 
effectiveness of civil commitment laws); John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enact-
ing a Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 468, 503 (1998) [he-
reinafter  La Fond, Costs] (same); John Q. La Fond, Outpatient Commitment’s 
Next Frontier, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 159, 182 (2003) (arguing for alter-
natives to SVP commitment); LA FOND, supra note 27, at 142–65 (focusing on 
the costs and constitutionality of commitment). But see Nora V. Demleitner, 
Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and Si-
cherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1623 (2003) (recognizing 
that commitment “presents the starkest example of a collateral sanction,” and 
urging replacement of the current approach to involuntary commitment in the 
United States, through SVPAs, with an approach that more closely approx-
imates the German model). 
 30. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring no warnings about any 
collateral consequence of pleading guilty); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-4 
(2004) (same); see also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93 (2008) (mandating warn-
ings about collateral consequences for immigration, but failing to require 
warnings about other collateral consequences). 
 31. See infra Part I.B. But see State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238–39 
(N.J. 2003) (finding that warnings were mandated as a matter of fundamental 
fairness because of the severity of the consequences); infra notes 248–259 and 
accompanying text (discussing Bellamy). 
 32. The constitutional right to advisement must be distinguished from the 
statutory right to advisement about one or more collateral consequences prior 
 2008] MYTH OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 677 
 
This approach demonstrates a fundamentally flawed con-
ception of what a defendant needs to know to make a guilty 
plea constitutionally sound. Adhering to a formalistic distinc-
tion between “direct” and “collateral” consequences creates a 
fiction that defendants knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty 
when they do not learn about those consequences, such as invo-
luntary commitment, that may matter more to them than the 
“direct” criminal punishment. It also creates the fiction that de-
fense counsel is competent despite failing to warn about such a 
critical consequence of the plea. The issue here is not whether 
convicted sex offenders should or should not be involuntarily 
committed, but rather whether they should be informed about 
the possibility of involuntary commitment. It is an argument 
for more complete information and transparency in the plea 
bargaining process, so that defendants like Thomas Steele can 
weigh the true costs and benefits of pleading guilty. 
Part I of this Article sets out the conceptual and constitu-
tional landscapes surrounding collateral consequences. After 
exploring the formalistic manner in which courts separate “di-
rect” from “collateral” consequences, it examines the two main 
constitutional rights framing the guilty plea process: due 
process and effective assistance of counsel. Part I also critiques 
the doctrinally flawed origins of the collateral-consequences 
rule. Part II briefly describes the growing trend among states 
for Sexually Violent Predator Acts and analyzes the collateral-
consequences rule in the context of such legislation. Part III in-
troduces the reasonableness standard, and then applies it to 
the consequence of involuntary commitment of “sexually violent 
predators.” Part III then explains how the reasonableness 
 
to entry of a guilty plea. In a growing number of states, court rules or state 
criminal procedure requires the court to advise a defendant about the immi-
gration consequences of a criminal conviction, although warnings are almost 
always limited to that one consequence. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 
n.48 (2001). However, unlike a constitutional violation of an advisement stan-
dard, failure to adhere to the statutory norm often offers no remedy for a de-
fendant. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2007) (Deemed 
repealed Sept. 1, 2009) (noting how the failure to advise the defendant of the 
immigration consequences of a felony guilty plea “shall not be deemed to affect 
the voluntariness of a plea of guilty or the validity of a conviction, nor shall it 
afford a defendant any rights in a subsequent proceeding relating to such de-
fendant’s deportation, exclusion or denial of naturalization”). In addition, most 
of the SVPA states do not mandate warnings about involuntary commitment. 
See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01. But see FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(9); MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 12(c)(3)(B) (requiring the trial judge to inform defendant on the 
record “of any different or additional punishment based upon . . . sexually 
dangerous persons provisions of the General Laws”). 
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standard corrects the current rule’s overemphasis on the insti-
tutional values of finality and efficiency, and underemphasis on 
the value of an individual’s right to information in the plea 
bargain process. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES   
A. THE FORMALISTIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN “DIRECT” AND 
“COLLATERAL” CONSEQUENCES 
Under the categorization scheme in the jurisprudence of 
criminal convictions, there are two types of consequences: di-
rect and collateral.33 These terms, however, are not self-
defining. As one commentator has described them, collateral 
consequences “are not part of the explicit punishment handed 
down by the court; they stem from the fact of conviction rather 
than from the sentence of the court.”34 Rather than appearing 
in the state or federal statute defining permissible sentences 
for the particular conviction,35 collateral consequences are scat-
tered throughout a variety of state and federal statutes and 
regulations, and increasingly in local laws.36 Though this Ar-
ticle restricts its definition of collateral consequences to those 
that result from some law or regulation that takes the fact of 
conviction into account in deciding whether to impose the par-
ticular consequence, there are many collateral consequences 
that are not codified.37 
 
 33. This Article uses “collateral” as that is the term that most commonly 
appears in the cases and professional standards. However, some commenta-
tors have noted that there are perhaps better—and more transparent—terms. 
See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, Holistic is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense 
Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 
U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 493 (2005) (stressing the importance of using the term 
“invisible,” because the strict definition of “collateral sanctions” does not en-
compass all consequences of a criminal conviction, such as those requiring a 
discretionary decision by an independent governmental agency). 
 34. Pinard, supra note 22, at 634. 
 35. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2008) (sen-
tences of imprisonment). 
 36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(f ) (2000) (barring individuals convicted of 
manufacturing methamphetamine from access to federally subsidized hous-
ing); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(5) (McKinney 2007) (allowing for evic-
tion proceedings following any illegal manufacture or business); N.Y. CITY 
HOUS. AUTH., GUIDE TO SECTION 8 HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 2 (May 
2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/070213N.pdf 
(listing local regulations denying assistance to persons with certain convic-
tions).  
 37. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 
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Direct consequences appear limited to the penal sanction 
that will be imposed as a result of a plea of guilty.38 Yet even 
consequences that seem to go to the heart of criminal punish-
ment foster disagreement. For example, in some circuits a de-
fendant may be sentenced in a federal criminal case without 
knowing that his federal sentence will not begin until he has 
finished serving a state sentence.39 The fact that the defendant 
will thus serve more prison time on the two cases than he ex-
pected when he pleaded guilty is deemed “collateral.”40 In other 
circuits, it is considered “direct.”41 In some circuits, the fact 
that a guilty plea to a particular charge will result in a defen-
dant’s ineligibility for parole is not a direct consequence.42 In 
 
937, 960 (2003) (discussing the employment consequences of having a criminal 
record). Convictions and incarceration result in social effects that relate to the 
convicted individual, his family and his community. See generally INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (compiling a series of articles 
outlining the social effects of convictions and incarceration). 
 38. There is little case law on what constitutes a direct consequence, as 
the issue most often arises when an individual tries to vacate a guilty plea 
based on consequences almost always deemed “collateral” by the reviewing 
court. It seems clear, however, from the cases addressing due process in the 
guilty plea context, that a defendant must at least know the sentence or range 
of sentences to which he will be exposed, should he plead guilty. See, e.g., Boy-
kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 254 (finding that a guilty plea was not invalidated by 
the fact that all parties had agreed that Hernandez would be allowed to serve 
his federal sentence concurrent to his state sentence and that, in fact, the 
state plea was postponed precisely to effectuate this aspect of the bargain); 
Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(“[C]onsequences . . . which are not related to the length or nature of the fed-
eral sentence cannot be considered direct consequences . . . . The statute did 
operate to increase the length of Kincade’s overall incarceration, but not by 
modifying his federal punishment.”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 1972), 
superseded by statute, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (finding that fed-
eral law making the district court powerless to impose a concurrent federal 
sentence when a defendant also faces state charges impacts that defendant’s 
maximum total imprisonment, and thus is a direct consequence that the de-
fendant must be aware of prior to entry of any guilty plea in the federal case). 
Although the federal statute at issue in Myers has since been amended to al-
low federal judges to impose a federal sentence concurrent to some state sen-
tences, 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (2000), the cases nonetheless illustrate how different 
circuits have approached an issue with such an enormous effect on the know-
ledge a defendant has about the amount of prison time he will serve. 
 42. See, e.g., Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(finding that parole eligibility is a matter of “legislative grace” and thus is not 
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other circuits, the opposite is true.43 In at least one circuit, the 
fact that the defendant would have to admit to a sexual offense 
as part of counseling required as a condition of his probation 
was considered collateral, even where the court had allowed 
that defendant to enter a nolo contendere plea, meaning that 
he did not have to admit guilt as part of his plea.44 
It is thus far from clear exactly where the line between di-
rect and collateral consequences falls. At a minimum, the ac-
tual term of jail or prison time imposed by the court, as well as 
any fines or term of probation, fall on the “direct” side of the 
line.45 Beyond that, the convoluted jurisprudence of what con-
stitutes a collateral consequence in each particular jurisdiction 
governs. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE: DUE PROCESS, 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, AND GUILTY PLEAS 
When a person charged in a criminal case pleads guilty, he 
gives up his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to 
a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine the govern-
ment’s witnesses.46 There are two sets of constitutional rules 
relevant to the waiver of these important rights and to the 
process surrounding, and leading up to, any guilty plea: the 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process stan-
dards.47 
All pleas must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.48 
The defendant must enter the plea in front of a judge or magi-
 
a direct consequence of a guilty plea). 
 43. See, e.g., Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964), 
overruled on other grounds by Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53, 55 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (“[O]ne who, at the time of entering a plea of guilty, is not aware of 
the fact that he will not be eligible for probation or parole, does not plead with 
understanding of the consequences of such a plea.”). 
 44. Duke v. Cockrell, 292 F.3d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2002). Duke was origi-
nally sentenced, under the plea bargain, to ten years of probation with the 
condition that he complete a sexual offender treatment program. Since he was 
unable to complete the program, the court resentenced him to twenty years in 
prison. Id. at 416; see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing nolo contendere pleas). 
 45. See, e.g., Duke, 292 F.3d at 417 (“[T]he direct consequences of a defen-
dant’s plea are the immediate and automatic consequences of that plea such as 
the maximum sentence length or fine.” (citation omitted)). 
 46. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. 
 48. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (“A plea of 
guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelli-
gent.’”); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
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strate who guards, through the plea allocution process, against 
coerced or unknowing pleas.49 In addition, a defendant must 
have a competent attorney who, among other things, counsels 
him so that he does not abandon his rights without understand-
ing what they mean.50 Due process thus applies to all parties 
involved in the plea process, while the effective assistance of 
counsel norm regulates only the behavior of defense counsel. 
Given these seemingly robust protections,51 one might im-
agine that defendants know what they are getting themselves 
into when they plead guilty. Yet courts continue to advance the 
fictions that lawyers are “effective” despite failing to warn 
about any number of consequences, and that judges who allow 
guilty pleas in the absence of knowledge of such consequences 
preside over voluntary, knowing, and intelligent pleas.52 
This fiction cuts across all types of consequences deemed 
“collateral,” so that a defendant may be surprised to learn that 
his guilty plea meets accepted constitutional standards even if 
taken in the absence of knowledge of, among many other 
things, mandatory sex offender registration;53 mandatory de-
portation;54 loss of the right to vote;55 loss of public housing for 
 
 49. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (finding, under due process principles, 
that the trial court must ensure that the record demonstrates that defendant’s 
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary). 
 50. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (“The entry of a guilty plea, 
whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at 
which the right to counsel adheres.” (citations omitted)). 
 51. They are “seemingly” robust because anyone who has practiced in the 
criminal justice system knows that the words in the constitutional jurispru-
dence of guilty pleas do not always translate into strong protections. For ex-
ample, judges often find pleas “voluntary” even though the defendant was se-
riously mentally ill or under the influence of drugs at the time he took the 
plea. See, e.g., Patterson v. Hampton, 355 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1966) (describing 
how the court accepted a guilty plea without holding a hearing on the defen-
dant’s mental capacity to plead guilty, despite the court’s knowledge of two 
state hospital psychiatric examinations and reports); cf. STEVE BOGIRA, COUR-
TROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURT-
HOUSE 203–07 (2005) (describing how a judge rejected testimony of three ex-
perts, including the director of the psychology department for county courts, 
that the defendant was too mentally retarded to knowingly waive his Miranda 
rights). 
 52. See, e.g., Patterson, 355 F.2d at 472. 
 53. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(“[E]ntering the guilty plea without knowledge of the potential for registration 
and community notification does not render his plea involuntary and, thus, 
does not violate the Constitution.”). 
 54. See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (citing cases from 
numerous circuit courts finding deportation to be a collateral consequence). 
 55. See, e.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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family members, even if the defendant does not live in that 
housing;56 revocation of a driver’s license;57 and even, in some 
jurisdictions, the date on which he becomes eligible for parole.58 
Federal constitutional law thus says little about what defense 
counsel must tell her client prior to any plea and quite a bit 
about what defense counsel need not disclose. 
This Article focuses on the consequences of guilty pleas be-
cause more than ninety-five percent of criminal convictions re-
sult from a plea.59 In addition, controversies over the right to 
information generally arise when a defendant enters a guilty 
plea without knowledge of a collateral consequence that may or 
will apply as a result of that plea. When a defendant exercises 
his right to trial, in theory he has no control to reject the con-
viction that might come as a result of that trial, and that could 
lead to various collateral consequences. In practice, however, a 
defendant will often choose to accept a particular plea bargain 
offer if it allows him to avoid a harsh collateral consequence 
that he would face should he be convicted of all charges after 
trial.60 For example, a defendant charged with sex abuse as 
well as endangering the welfare of a child might prefer to plead 
guilty to the endangering count, even if both are the same level 
 
 56. See Truman, supra note 28, at 1769. 
 57. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 58. See Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996) (“It is well set-
tled that the Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided with 
information concerning parole eligibility.”); Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 788 
(6th Cir. 1983) (“This Circuit has expressly declined to consider parole eligibil-
ity a direct consequence of a guilty plea.”). But see Michel v. United States, 507 
F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (explaining that defendant must be advised of pa-
role term that automatically attaches to sentence of imprisonment); Craig v. 
People, 986 P.2d 951, 963 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (“Mandatory parole is a direct 
consequence of pleading guilty to a charge which subjects a defendant to im-
mediate imprisonment because it has an ‘immediate and largely automatic 
effect on the range of possible punishment.’” (citation omitted)); People v. Ca-
tu, 825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082–83 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that mandatory postrelease 
supervision is a direct consequence that requires notification to the defen-
dant). 
 59. Federal criminal cases against 83,391 defendants were terminated 
during 2004. Ninety percent of these defendants were convicted. Of those, ni-
nety-six percent pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2007), http:// 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm. Approximately 57,497 felony cases were filed 
in state courts of the nation’s seventy-five largest counties during May 2004. 
Ninety-seven percent of convictions occurring within one year of arrest were 
by guilty plea. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMI-
NAL CASE PROCESSING STATISTICS (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases 
.htm. 
 60. See Smyth, supra note 33, at 484. 
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of misdemeanor with the same potential penal consequence. 
This is because the state where the defendant pleads guilty 
might require sex offender registration for misdemeanor sex 
abuse convictions but not for endangering convictions. In such 
a case, a defendant could argue that he would have accepted 
the offered plea bargain had he known that it would have al-
lowed him to avoid a consequence that he now faces based on 
conviction after trial.61 For these reasons, the standard pro-
posed in this Article asks whether the consequence would cause 
a reasonable person to accept or reject any opportunity to plead 
guilty. 
1. Due Process and Collateral Consequences: No Duty to 
Warn Defendants 
Due process is “the dominant source of constitutional regu-
lation” in the plea bargaining arena.62 The body of law distin-
guishing direct from collateral consequences arises from the ju-
risprudence of plea bargains, namely, the requirement that 
guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary to satisfy due 
process.63 The knowledge prong establishes the minimum 
amount of information that a defendant must possess before a 
court may accept his guilty plea. The Due Process Clause 
speaks to the role of both defense counsel and the trial judge as 
providers of this information.64 
 
 61. See generally Boria v. Keane, 83 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding in-
effective assistance of counsel where Boria’s lawyer failed to counsel him to 
accept a plea bargain despite his “professional judgment that it was almost 
impossible for a ‘buy and bust’ defendant to obtain an acquittal” in that juris-
diction). Although a search has uncovered no cases where a defendant has 
sought to reverse a jury verdict (as opposed to a guilty plea) on the grounds 
that he would have accepted a plea offer to avoid a collateral consequence had 
his attorney made him aware of that consequence, it is certainly a viable claim 
in the wake of Boria. 
 62. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.7(a), at 78 (3d ed. 
2000). 
 63. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970). 
 64. For constitutional, ethical, and practical reasons, prosecutors should 
not communicate with a represented defendant unless defense counsel is 
present. Thus, the prosecutor is not the party responsible for communicating 
information about direct or collateral consequences to a defendant. However, a 
prosecutor can cause a guilty plea to violate the Due Process Clause if she af-
firmatively misrepresents a consequence of a conviction and if this misrepre-
sentation is not corrected. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 36 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[Since the] record on appeal makes it clear that the prosecu-
tion made misrepresentations concerning the deportation consequences of the 
defendant’s plea . . . we must vacate the defendant’s guilty plea.”); United 
States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Calculations of the 
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The question is: exactly what information must a defen-
dant possess in order to make his plea valid under the Due 
Process Clause? The general, current answer is: very little 
beyond the criminal sanction that the trial court can impose 
through the jurisdiction’s penal-sentencing laws. 
a. Brady v. United States: The Shaky Doctrinal Cornerstone of 
the Collateral-Consequences Rule 
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the 
issue of whether a defendant’s ignorance of the collateral con-
sequences of his guilty plea violates due process.65 Lower feder-
al and state courts, however, have established what this Article 
refers to as the “collateral-consequences rule,” namely, that 
lack of knowledge about collateral consequences will not cause 
a guilty plea to violate constitutional norms.66  
The rule rests on a doctrinally flawed analysis. The courts 
have fashioned the collateral-consequences rule through re-
liance on the Supreme Court’s statement, in Brady v. United 
States, that voluntary guilty pleas are made “by one fully aware 
of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
 
likelihood of deportation may thus rightly be included in the judgment as to 
whether an accused should plead guilty, and any actions by Government coun-
sel that create a misapprehension as to that likelihood may undercut the vo-
luntariness of the plea.”). 
 65. Cf. Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[N]o Supreme 
Court precedent establishes that parole ineligibility constitutes a direct, ra-
ther than a collateral, consequence of a guilty plea.”). Nevertheless, at least 
with respect to parole ineligibility, the Supreme Court has strongly indicated 
that it would not find a due process right to such information. See Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (“We have never held that the United States 
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about 
parole eligibility in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary, and 
indeed such a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the cur-
rent rules of procedure governing the entry of guilty pleas in the federal 
courts.” (emphasis added)). 
 66. Many decisions considering claims of a due process violation based on 
preplea lack of information about a collateral consequence relate to deporta-
tion. As one court recently noted: 
Each federal circuit that has directly considered the issue has held 
that deportation is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty so that 
the trial court is not required to inform the defendant of the immigra-
tion consequences of his or her plea. Furthermore, the remaining fed-
eral circuits that have not directly addressed the issue have signaled 
that they would reach the same holding. 
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004). 
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counsel.”67 These brief words in Brady did not result from care-
ful reasoning about exactly what type and quantum of informa-
tion a defendant must have in order to meet the “knowledge” 
requirement for guilty pleas. Indeed, because knowledge of con-
sequences was not the issue presented in Brady, the Court did 
not go any further in defining what it meant by “direct conse-
quences.” The words spring from dicta in a decision that fo-
cused on a different aspect of the plea process—that of volunta-
riness. 
Whatever its force in the original opinion, the “direct con-
sequences” language from Brady has become the doctrinal cor-
nerstone of the distinction between direct and collateral conse-
quences.68 Closer examination of Brady illustrates why this is 
such shaky ground upon which to build a rule, particularly one 
that has such an enormous effect on the transparency and legi-
timacy of the criminal justice system. 
Robert Brady was charged under a federal kidnapping sta-
tute which allowed for the death penalty only upon a jury ver-
dict. The judge could not impose death without such a verdict, 
and thus a guilty plea foreclosed a death sentence. Brady origi-
nally pleaded not guilty, but later changed that plea and the 
judge sentenced him to fifty years in prison.69 Some years later, 
Brady filed a petition for habeas corpus.70 Among other things, 
Brady challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea “because 
[the federal statute under which he was prosecuted] operated to 
coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible 
pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by repre-
sentations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemen-
cy.”71 He did not claim that lack of knowledge invalidated his 
plea.72 
 
 67. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quo-
tation omitted). 
 68. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 726 
(2002) (“The collateral-consequences rule is based in large part on the Brady 
Court’s implication that a trial court need advise a defendant only of direct 
consequences to render a plea voluntary under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 69. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743–44 (noting that a fifty-year sentence was later 
reduced to a thirty-year sentence). 
 70. Id. at 744. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Brief for the Petitioner at 18, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970) (No. 270), 1969 WL 119963 (“[T]he fear of the death penalty was a fac-
tor, if not the primary factor, in influencing the Petitioner to plead guilty to 
the kidnapping charge against him, and, therefore, his guilty plea was invo-
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Brady is perhaps best known for clearly stating the rule 
that guilty pleas “not only must be voluntary but must be 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”73 The bulk of 
the Court’s analysis examined Brady’s claim that his guilty 
plea was coerced, and thus focused on voluntariness. At the end 
of its voluntariness analysis, the Court quoted from Shelton v. 
United States, an unrelated Fifth Circuit case: 
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essen-
tially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the di-
rect consequences, including the actual value of any commitments 
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand 
unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper ha-
rassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper 
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. 
bribes).”74 
In this quotation the Court clearly references awareness of 
“direct consequences” in determining the validity of a guilty 
plea. This has led some commentators to declare that “[t]he 
Supreme Court created the rule that the Due Process Clause 
requires the trial court to explain only the direct consequences 
of conviction.”75 Neither Shelton nor Brady, however, examined 
a defendant’s claim of lack of knowledge of either direct or col-
lateral consequences of a guilty plea. J. Paul Shelton claimed 
that promised leniencies, about such things as dismissal of oth-
er criminal charges and a specific sentence of imprisonment, 
 
luntary and in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 73. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. Nevertheless, as the Court noted, “[t]he re-
quirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be valid 
has long been recognized.” Id. at 747 n.4. 
 74. Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). The en 
banc Fifth Circuit decision, in turn, quotes from the dissenting judge from the 
original Fifth Circuit panel in the case. Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n.2 (quoting 
Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissent-
ing), rev’d en banc, Shelton, 246 F.2d 571). 
 75. Chin & Holmes, supra note 68, at 706. For an interpretation of the 
Fifth Circuit voluntariness test that differs in significant ways with respect to 
the due process analysis in this Article, see id. at 726–30 (analyzing Brady’s 
adoption of Fifth Circuit voluntariness test as “the Court accept[ing] the colla-
teral-direct distinction in the context of what consequences the trial judge was 
required to explain to ensure voluntariness”). See also Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 
F.3d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brady’s “direct consequences” language, 
along with several other factors, to determine if a guilty plea was voluntary 
and intelligent). 
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led to his involuntary guilty plea.76 These promises all related 
to Shelton’s criminal case and not to any consequences “colla-
teral” to that proceeding. Shelton, like Brady, focused on 
whether such promises and inducements could operate to rend-
er a plea involuntary.77 
The Fifth Circuit test stated that a plea taken with aware-
ness of direct consequences must stand unless induced by 
threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. The original 
Fifth Circuit dissent, from which the en banc court (and Brady) 
later drew its voluntariness definition, described two categories 
of guilty pleas that would qualify as involuntary. The first re-
lated to coercion by physical or psychological pressure or 
threats. The second related to a defendant’s misapprehension of 
promises that were not or could not be kept. In other words, in-
ducements that might render a plea involuntary.78 
Nowhere in this dissent, in any of the other Shelton opi-
nions, or in Brady itself, is there any consideration or discus-
sion of the claim that lack of information about a consequence 
other than a penal sanction might render the guilty plea 
invalid under the Due Process Clause. These cases all are about 
coercion by threat or improper inducement, which go to the vo-
luntariness of a guilty plea, not knowledge. 
The “direct consequences” language in Brady is thus an 
unexplored definition that comprises one part of a multifactor 
voluntariness test. But it could also be characterized as dicta, 
an undefined precondition to the true voluntariness definition 
 
 76. Shelton, 242 F.2d at 102. 
 77. In the wake of Brady, many lower courts have conflated the require-
ments of knowledge and voluntariness. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 
234 F.3d 252, 254 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘knowing’ are 
frequently used interchangeably, although, strictly speaking, the terms embo-
dy different concepts.”); see also John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Fe-
lony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 
U. PA. L. REV. 88, 91–92 n.16 (1977) (“It is sometimes difficult to discern 
where the concept of ‘voluntariness’ ends and that of ‘intelligence’ begins.”). 
But see Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting how 
the Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that a guilty plea must not only be en-
tered voluntarily, but also knowingly and intelligently: the defendant must be 
aware of the relevant circumstances and the likely consequences.” (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 78. Shelton, 242 F.2d at 114–15. The dissent first described this second 
category as “includ[ing] all the cases in which for one reason or another the 
defendant was not fully aware of all the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 114. 
Although this sounds like “knowledge,” the dissenting judge went on to sup-
port this statement with citation to cases that all relate to misapprehension by 
a defendant due to promises that were not or cannot be kept. Id. 
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which follows. As the original Shelton panel’s majority opinion 
noted: “That [the guilty plea] was understandingly made in this 
case is not controverted, but the question is, was the guilty plea 
made voluntarily?”79 Thus, even if the Fifth Circuit meant to 
conflate the definition of knowledge into what it clearly termed 
“the relevant definition of voluntariness,”80 knowledge was not 
an issue before that court. 
After concluding its voluntariness discussion, the Supreme 
Court in Brady did undertake a short exploration of the know-
ledge prong: 
The record before us also supports the conclusion that Brady’s plea 
was intelligently made. He was advised by competent counsel, he was 
made aware of the nature of the charge against him, and there was 
nothing to indicate that he was incompetent or otherwise not in con-
trol of his mental faculties; once his confederate had pleaded guilty 
and became available to testify, he chose to plead guilty, perhaps to 
ensure that he would face no more than life imprisonment or a term 
of years. Brady was aware of precisely what he was doing when he 
admitted that he had kidnaped [sic] the victim and had not released 
her unharmed.81 
The Court addressed this issue in order to reject Brady’s 
argument that his plea was invalid because the Supreme 
Court, nine years after the plea, invalidated that part of the 
federal kidnapping statute which allowed for a death sentence 
by jury verdict only.82 The Court thus found that “absent mi-
srepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, 
a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the 
then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later 
judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty pre-
mise.”83 This brief discussion of the knowledge requirement 
evinced a concern with affirmative misrepresentations of direct 
consequences (and denied the claim that such misrepresenta-
tion was present in the case), but did not address collateral 
consequences. 
 
 79. Id. at 112. In rehearing the case en banc, the court found that “[t]he 
original opinion sufficiently sets out the facts except as to those matters which 
will be added here,” thus accepting the finding that the knowledge require-
ment was uncontroverted. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th 
Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). 
 80. Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572. 
 81. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 757 (citation omitted) (citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 
(1948)). 
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Knowledge stands separately from voluntariness in the due 
process requirements for guilty pleas. Although the Supreme 
Court has never directly examined the constitutionality of a 
guilty plea taken without knowledge of a collateral conse-
quence, many lower federal and state courts blindly cite Brady 
in fashioning the collateral-consequences rule. As one court 
quite starkly put it, quoting Brady’s “direct consequences” lan-
guage: “We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it 
said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded col-
lateral consequences.”84 This is an incorrect presumption, and 
it rests on shaky doctrinal ground. 
b. Varying Definitions of Brady’s “Direct Consequences” 
Language 
Although the Court in Brady did not define “direct conse-
quences,” a long line of (generally sparsely reasoned) lower fed-
eral and state court decisions following Brady have crafted a 
definition by omission. They have done this by labeling particu-
lar consequences “collateral,” and then rejecting defendants’ 
requests to withdraw guilty pleas due to lack of knowledge of 
those consequences. Building on the weak foundations of the 
Brady dicta, the lower courts have developed three different, 
and largely unsatisfactory, definitions of a “direct” conse-
quence: (1) whether the consequence is “definite, immediate 
and largely automatic”;85 (2) whether the consequence is puni-
tive;86 and (3) whether the consequence is within the “control 
and responsibility” of the sentencing court.87  
 i. “Definite, Immediate and Largely Automatic” 
Three years after Brady, the Fourth Circuit offered what is 
probably the most widely cited definition of a “direct conse-
quence.” In Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, the court 
noted that “[t]he distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ 
consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant 
decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, 
immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the de-
fendant’s punishment.”88 
 
 84. United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). 
 85. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 86. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
 87. El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 88. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366. 
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Joseph Cuthrell claimed that his guilty plea was involun-
tary because he had not been warned that it might result in in-
voluntary commitment under Maryland’s Defective Delin-
quents Act.89 At the time, such commitment either replaced or 
counted towards any term of imprisonment that the sentencing 
court had imposed,90 although it was indeterminate in length.91 
Using the “definite, immediate and largely automatic” test, the 
court rejected Cuthrell’s claim. It found that because commit-
ment was not definite and because the Maryland Act mandated 
a separate civil proceeding, Cuthrell was not entitled to any 
warnings as a matter of due process.92 
Many courts cite Cuthrell’s “definite, immediate and large-
ly automatic” language in setting out their criteria for deter-
mining whether a particular consequence is direct.93 However, 
as Texas’s highest court for criminal appeals recently noted in a 
rather scathing critique, with respect to its definition of “direct” 
the Fourth Circuit offered “no citation to statute or case law or 
any other legal authority; there is merely the assertion that it 
is so.”94 The Cuthrell court gave only one example of a “direct” 
consequence: parole eligibility. The court explained that “[t]he 
reason for this conclusion is that the right to parole has become 
so engrafted on the criminal sentence that such right is as-
sumed by the average defendant and is directly related in the 
 
 89. Id. at 1367. 
 90. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1155–56 (4th Cir. 1971) (ex-
plaining the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act). 
 91. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1367. 
 92. Id. at 1366. 
 93. E.g., United States v. U. S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536, 895 
F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting how, under the Cuthrell standard, “civil 
forfeiture is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea because it does not 
represent ‘a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of 
the defendant’s punishment’” (citation omitted)); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 
234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988). A Westlaw “citing references” check of the Cuthrell 
decision on January 24, 2008 shows 177 decisions citing it, only three of them 
distinguishing or disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit. 
 94. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The 
court in Mitschke noted other major flaws in Cuthrell. First, “[w]hy is the dis-
tinction [between direct and collateral] made on the basis of effect on the range 
of punishment? The range of punishment is set by law. If we require that a 
plea of guilty affect the range of punishment, very few consequences will ever 
be direct.” Id. at 133. Second, “[w]hy must the effect be immediate?” Id.  The 
court noted how some consequences, such as the prohibition on possession of a 
firearm after a felony conviction or sex offender registration, are both definite 
and automatic. However, they do not flow immediately after punishment, be-
cause they apply only after an incarcerated person is released, which could be 
years after the sentence. Id. 
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defendant’s mind with the length of his sentence.”95 This rea-
son, however, does not coincide with Cuthrell’s definition of “di-
rect.” Parole may be engrafted, but it is not immediate, as it 
must come after a term of imprisonment. It is not automatic, 
but rather is a matter that a parole board must consider. It is 
not definite, since release is a matter of discretion with the 
board. 
The Cuthrell parole dictum is quite important in how it 
took into account the perspective of the “average” (reasonable) 
defendant about the consequences of his guilty plea. Neverthe-
less, while it correctly identified this critical value in its inquiry 
into the validity of the plea under due process principles, it 
completely failed to capture that value in the definition that it 
crafted, upon which many state and federal courts now rely. 
 ii. Punitive v. Nonpunitive Consequences 
The same Texas court that eschewed the Cuthrell approach 
came up with its own manner of determining whether a partic-
ular consequence merits warnings before a guilty plea. In 
Mitschke v. State, the court built upon the direct-collateral di-
chotomy for warnings, finding that “[e]ven if the consequence is 
direct, . . . imposition of it without admonishment might still be 
justified as remedial and civil rather than punitive.”96 
John Mitschke sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing 
that failure to inform him about mandatory sex offender regis-
tration based on his conviction violated his due process rights.97 
The court agreed that “the consequence, registration as a sex 
offender, is definite. It is also completely automatic; if a defen-
dant pleads to an enumerated offense, he must register; there 
are no exceptions, no wiggle room, no conditions which relieve 
him of that obligation.”98 But it denied Mitschke’s claim, find-
ing that not all direct consequences merit constitutionally 
mandated warnings.99 
The court stated that “[a] statute that can fairly be charac-
terized as remedial, both in its purpose and implementing pro-
visions, does not constitute punishment even though its re-
medial provisions have some inevitable deterrent affect, and 
 
 95. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1972)). 
 96. Mitschke, 129 S.W.3d at 135. 
 97. Id. at 132. 
 98. Id. at 135. 
 99. Id. at 136. 
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even though it may indirectly and adversely affect, potentially 
severely, some of those subject to its provisions.”100 Under this 
definition, sex offender registration was nonpunitive and thus 
no warnings were required. 
 iii. “Control and Responsibility” 
Immigration law reforms of the mid-1990s took almost all 
discretion away from immigration authorities to grant relief 
from deportation for large classes of criminal convictions.101 
Since that time, a number of defendants have argued that de-
portation based on these convictions is now an automatic, defi-
nite consequence that requires preplea warnings. A number of 
courts have rejected such claims by relying on yet a third way 
to draw the line between consequences that require or do not 
require warnings, namely, by privileging consequences that are 
under the “control and responsibility” of the sentencing court. 
Abdel-Karim El-Nobani was a lawful permanent resident 
of the United States.102 Shortly after El-Nobani pleaded guilty 
to conspiracy to traffic food stamps and alien harboring, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service began deportation 
proceedings against him.103 In seeking to withdraw his guilty 
plea, El-Nobani argued that he had not been warned about the 
deportation consequences of that plea. Although the Sixth Cir-
cuit ruled against El-Nobani on procedural grounds, it went on 
to state that “the automatic nature of the deportation proceed-
ing does not necessarily make deportation a direct consequence 
of the guilty plea. A collateral consequence is one that remains 
beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in 
which that conviction was entered.”104 
Although this definition quite neatly allows for denial of 
claims of due process violations for failure to warn about immi-
 
 100. Id. at 135 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re B.G.M., 929 
S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. App. 1996)). 
 101. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 to -553 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 102. El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 103. Id. at 420. 
 104. Id. at 421 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)); see also Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27  
(“However ‘automatically’ Gonzalez’s deportation—or administrative deten-
tion—might follow from his conviction, it remains beyond the control and re-
sponsibility of the district court in which that conviction was entered and it 
thus remains a collateral consequence thereof.”). 
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gration consequences, and some courts may in fact have chosen 
it rather than Cuthrell for precisely this purpose, the “control 
and responsibility” language predates the 1996 immigration 
law amendments. As early as 1974, the Second Circuit used 
similar language in denying a deportation-based plea with-
drawal request, finding that “[d]eportation . . . was not the sen-
tence of the court which accepted the plea but of another agen-
cy over which the trial judge has no control and for which he 
has no responsibility.”105 The court further explained that the 
direct-collateral distinction does not depend “upon the degree of 
certainty with which the sanction will be visited upon the de-
fendant.” Instead, the trial judge “must assure himself only 
that the punishment that he is meting out is understood.”106 
2. Effective Assistance of Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences 
Although this Article proposes a reasonableness standard 
for the due process right to information about consequences, 
such a standard also has implications for the assessment of 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This section thus 
briefly reviews the current state of any right to information 
about collateral consequences under the Sixth Amendment, 
with a particular focus on the way in which courts have con-
flated due process and right to counsel analyses in this area. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel owes a duty 
of “effective assistance” to her client.107 The nature of an attor-
ney’s relationship with her client is very different than the re-
lationship between a judge, who simply approves and then pre-
sides over the guilty plea, and a defendant. Despite this, many 
courts have improperly imported due process standards into 
decisions analyzing ineffective assistance so that the trial judge 
and defense counsel are held to the same low standard as in-
formation providers in the guilty plea process. 
In the years since Gideon v. Wainwright made the right to 
counsel binding upon the states,108 the courts have cultivated a 
rather anemic right to the “effective assistance of counsel” un-
 
 105. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (basing its 
holding on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and not the Constitution). 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right 
to effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 108. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). 
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der the Sixth Amendment.109 Under the well-established two-
prong test for ineffective assistance, articulated in Strickland v. 
Washington and later applied to guilty pleas, a defendant must 
establish that: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable attorney performance, and (2) there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s incompetent per-
formance, he would not have pleaded guilty.110 The standard is 
highly deferential to the autonomy of defense lawyers (and de-
monstrates a strong reluctance towards court oversight of crim-
inal defense representation), as illustrated by the strong pre-
sumption in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that counsel’s 
decisions are “strategic.”111 
In the context of collateral consequences, the right to coun-
sel is virtually nonexistent.112 Courts rely on the same direct-
collateral divide in this area as they do in their due process de-
cisions. The South Carolina Supreme Court’s recent examina-
tion of an ineffective assistance claim starkly illustrates the 
merger of due process and effective assistance norms. Joseph 
Page pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct and other 
charges in exchange for a promise of no more than twenty years 
in prison.113 Neither Page’s lawyer nor the judge informed him 
 
 109. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty 
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627 (1986) (noting that the right to effective coun-
sel does not necessarily mean the right to quality counsel); Note, Gideon’s 
Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2062 (2000) (“[T]he states have largely, and often outra-
geously, failed to meet the Court’s constitutional command.”). 
 110. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); see also Rom-
pilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (restating Strickland’s two-prong test). 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court held “that the two-part 
Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 58. 
 111. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that for claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 
highly deferential” and that “the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 112. There is one general exception: when defense counsel affirmatively 
misrepresents the collateral consequence. See, e.g., Roberti v. Florida, 782 So. 
2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Affirmative misadvice about even a col-
lateral consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and 
provides a basis on which to withdraw the plea.”). But see Commonwealth v. 
Padilla, 732 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008) (holding that the defense counsel’s 
mistaken advice to his client about the potential deportation consequences of a 
guilty plea provided no basis for vacating the defendant’s sentence).  
 113. Page v. State, 615 S.E.2d 740, 741 (S.C. 2005). 
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about South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act.114 The 
Act mandates the involuntary, secure confinement of individu-
als convicted of a “sexually violent offense” who “suffer[] from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the 
person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined 
in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treat-
ment.”115 Such individuals must remain confined “until such 
time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder 
has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.”116 
As the Page court noted, the criminal conviction is the trig-
gering event for South Carolina’s SVPA; it sets in motion a 
process that includes a separate trial at which the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person qualifies as a 
“sexually violent predator.”117 Because of this, involuntary 
commitment did not “flow directly from [Page’s] guilty plea,” 
but was instead collateral.118 The court held that Page’s lawyer 
had no duty to inform him about the SVPA before he pleaded 
guilty.119 
The Page decision slips loosely between due process and 
ineffective assistance of counsel norms. Initially presenting the 
issue as one of due process,120 the court relied on the two-prong 
Strickland test to frame its analysis of ineffective assistance.121 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (Supp. 2006). Between the 1998 passage of 
the South Carolina SVPA and December 2004, the state used it to involuntari-
ly commit eighty-six people. Fifteen of those people were released in those six 
years. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF 
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: COMPARING STATE LAWS 4 (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=05-03-1101 [hereinafter COMPARING 
STATE LAWS]. 
 116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100. 
 117. Page, 615 S.E.2d at 742; see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170. 
 118. Page, 615 S.E.2d at 742. 
 119. Id. The South Carolina statute is a typical SVPA; most of the states 
that now have such statutes modeled them on the Kansas SVPA, which the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld in 1997. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
346–47 (1997) (rejecting ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges to Kan-
sas’s SVPA and finding that the Act’s procedures comported with due process 
standards); see also Page, 615 S.E.2d at 742 (noting that South Carolina’s 
SVPA is patterned after Kansas’s); see infra Part II.A. (describing SVPAs and 
relevant case law). 
 120. See Page, 615 S.E.2d at 741 (“Was Petitioner’s plea entered knowing-
ly, voluntarily, and intelligently where Petitioner was not informed he would 
be potentially liable under the Sexually Violent Predator Act after completing 
his sentence?”). The court also noted that the trial judge did not discuss the 
SVPA with Page before his plea. Id. 
 121. See id.; see also supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text (discuss-
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The decision then discussed two cases stating that due process 
requires that a defendant be told only of direct consequences of 
his criminal conviction.122 While the court did go on to cite one 
ineffective assistance case, it followed this with a string citation 
to four more due process cases. These four, as well as the two 
cited earlier in the decision, all analyzed the collateral-direct 
distinction in the context of a judge’s duty to warn a defendant, 
during the plea allocution, about consequences of the convic-
tion. Thus, only one of the cases cited in Page considers the role 
of defense counsel in warning a client about collateral conse-
quences. 
This importation of the due process-based collateral-
consequences rule into the ineffective assistance realm is high-
ly problematic because it treats the roles of defense counsel and 
the trial judge as identical. In their insightful exploration of the 
myriad doctrinal weaknesses of the collateral-consequences 
rule, Professor Gabriel Chin and Richard Holmes note that: 
[J]ust as defense counsel and the court have different duties of loyal-
ty, investigation, and legal research as a result of their distinct roles 
as advocate and decisionmaker, there is no reason to assume that 
their obligations of advising the accused of the risks and benefits of 
pleading guilty should be identical. The judge is charged with ensur-
ing that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; counsel’s job 
is to assist with the determination that a plea is a good idea, which 
encompasses a broader range of considerations.123 
Yet most of the courts examining defendants’ claims of lack 
of knowledge, like Page, fail to make any distinction between 
defense counsel and the trial judge when discussing responsi-
bility to warn about collateral consequences.124 
 
ing two-prong Strickland test). 
 122. Page, 615 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 
F.2d 1364, 1366–67 (4th Cir. 1973) and Brown v. State, 412 S.E.2d 399, 400 
(S.C. 1991)). 
 123. Chin & Holmes, supra note 68, at 727; see also id. at 724–36 (setting 
out five categories of cases which suggest that the collateral-consequences rule 
is invalid when applied to effective assistance of counsel). In an early and 
comprehensive critique of the collateral-consequences rule, Guy Cohen de-
scribed the importation of due process principles into the effective assistance 
realm as “distort[ing] the jurisprudence upon which it is based.” Guy Cohen, 
Note, Weakness of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine: Counsel’s Duty to In-
form Aliens of the Deportation Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 16 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1094, 1143–45 (1993).  
 124. Indeed, some courts insist that there is no such distinction, at least in 
the guilty plea context. See, e.g., Morales v. State, 104 S.W.3d 432, 434–35 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on a state statute requiring judges to warn defen-
dants only about direct consequences to support a finding that defense counsel 
must also warn only about such consequences and noting that, “[f ]ollowing a 
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Certainly, the due process protections surrounding a guilty 
plea and the right to counsel for that plea are not mutually ex-
clusive. If a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel 
leading up to a guilty plea, then that plea cannot be made kno-
wingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.125 But the fact that inef-
fective assistance means that a plea also violates due process 
does not mean that there is ineffective assistance only when the 
plea violates due process. The judge and defense counsel play 
very different roles with respect to a person pleading guilty in a 
criminal case.126 Indeed, the labels of “defendant” or “client” in 
relation to those roles make the point. While the judge must 
ensure, on the record, that a plea is entered voluntarily and 
with the requisite knowledge,127 she is not charged with the 
underlying counseling of the defendant before the plea.128 The 
judge’s role is much more limited, both in terms of time spent 
with a defendant and the extremely limited scope of permissi-
ble inquiry.129 For example, the judge should ask the defendant 
if anyone is forcing him to plead guilty,130 but generally cannot 
explore with the defendant the wisdom of that plea.131 
In State v. Paredez, the New Mexico Supreme Court recog-
nized the different roles of the judge and defense counsel in the 
context of the duty to advise defendants about the particularly 
severe collateral consequence of deportation.132 The trial judge 
had followed a state statute requiring judges only to advise de-
fendants that a conviction “may have an effect upon 
the[ir] . . . immigration or naturalization status.”133 In review-
ing that warning, the court found that the Due Process Clause 
 
guilty plea, the effectiveness of counsel is relevant only to the extent that it 
affected whether or not the plea was made voluntarily and knowingly” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 125. See United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-
Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 128. See, e.g., Salisbury v. Blackburn, 792 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that counsel should inform the accused of available options prior to 
any guilty plea). 
 129. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in [plea] 
discussions.”). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, Nos. 94-6249, 94-6251, 1995 WL 
133364, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 1995) (noting that the judge thoroughly ex-
amined whether the defendant “was being forced to plead guilty”). 
 131. See, e.g., Salisbury, 792 F.2d at 500.  
 132. See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 802–04 (N.M. 2004). 
 133. Id. at 802 (citing N.M. RULES ANN. § 5-303 (West 2007)) (emphasis 
added). 
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did not require more, despite the fact that deportation was au-
tomatic in Mr. Paredez’s case.134 The court did not, however, 
treat defense counsel’s responsibilities as identical to the 
judge’s: “counsel is in a much better position to ascertain the 
personal circumstances of his or her client so as to determine 
what indirect consequences the guilty plea may trigger.”135 The 
court did not stop with its holding that defense counsel must 
correctly advise her client about the automatic nature of depor-
tation.136 It went one step further, holding that “an attorney’s 
nonadvice to an alien defendant on the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea would also be deficient performance.”137 
Paredez represents a significant advance with respect to 
both the reality about the need for, and the constitutional right 
to, information about serious consequences in the plea decision-
making process. Defense counsel is certainly best situated to 
explore such areas in the appropriate manner with her client. 
Paredez, however, missed the opportunity to have trial courts 
ensure, through the mechanism of constitutional due process, 
that counsel fulfill this critical function.138 The right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel, inquiry into which is usually un-
dertaken, if at all, on collateral review long after the conviction, 
has certainly not ameliorated the widely acknowledged and on-
going crisis in the provision of indigent-defense services.139 
Courts, at the time the plea decision-making process is happen-
ing rather than years later, can advance the value of knowled-
 
 134. The court went on to state:  
[W]hile it certainly would have been prudent for the district court to 
have been more specific in its admonition to Defendant or to inquire 
into Defendant’s understanding of the deportation consequences of his 
plea, we hold that the district court was not constitutionally required 
to advise Defendant that his guilty plea to criminal sexual contact of 
a minor almost certainly would result in his deportation. 
Id. at 803. 
 135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 804 (“When a defendant’s guilty plea almost certainly will result 
in deportation, an attorney’s advice to the client that he or she ‘could’ or 
‘might’ be deported would be misleading and thus deficient.”). 
 137. Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56, 64–65 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (applying Paredez to the sex offender registration context 
and finding that defense counsel has a Sixth Amendment duty to advise a de-
fendant about registration and notification consequences of any guilty plea). 
 138. To be fair, the Paredez court did recommend that the legislature con-
sider the adoption of a statute that would codify such oversight. Paredez, 101 
P.3d at 802. The court did not, however, go so far as to require it as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. Id. at 803. 
 139. See infra note 227 (discussing the crisis). 
 2008] MYTH OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 699 
 
geable guilty pleas by directly warning, or by ensuring that de-
fense counsel warns, about severe collateral consequences. 
Courts are already charged with ensuring that a guilty plea is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.140 Just as defense counsel 
are able to ask a few more questions to determine if counseling 
about one or more collateral consequences is necessary,141 so 
too can the courts make minor adjustments to their plea allocu-
tion processes to protect such important rights.142 
Even with respect to imposing an affirmative Sixth 
Amendment duty on defense lawyers to advise their clients 
about immigration—or any other consequence—the New Mex-
ico approach is unique.143 The Page case is representative of the 
generally flawed analysis of the Sixth Amendment collateral-
consequences line of cases because it imports the due process 
analysis into the effective assistance context without any rea-
soning. The current rule in almost all jurisdictions is that a de-
fendant has no right, under either due process or effective as-
sistance, to information about the collateral consequences of a 
guilty plea.144 
 
 140. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
 141. See Smyth, supra note 33, at 497 (urging defense counsel to incorpo-
rate “invisible punishments” into their plea bargaining strategies); see also Pi-
nard, supra note 22, at 685 (“Incorporating the collateral consequences and 
reentry components into [plea] negotiations would allow defense attorneys to 
more accurately lay out both the immediate and long term effects of the par-
ticular disposition.”). 
 142. Indeed, some states already have statutes requiring certain warnings, 
and some do so by way of court oversight over defense counsel. See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.40.200(2) (2002). Section 10.40.200(2) states:  
Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty . . . the court shall determine 
that the defendant has been advised of the following potential conse-
quences of conviction for a defendant who is not a citizen of the Unit-
ed States: Deportation, exclusion from admission to the United 
States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United 
States. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also infra notes 248–257, 342–345 and accompany-
ing text (describing how the New Jersey courts have added SVPA warnings to 
their plea forms in the wake of a state supreme court decision on the issue). 
 143. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that it might find that 
defense counsel’s failure to inform about the consequence of deportation prior 
to a guilty plea satisfies the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel—attorney competence. See infra note 205. 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“While the Sixth Amendment assures an accused of effective assistance of 
counsel in ‘criminal prosecutions,’ this assurance does not extend to collateral 
aspects of the prosecution.”); Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 806 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1999) (denying, on due process grounds, the Petitioners' request to with-
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C. THE OUTDATED LANDSCAPE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
The Brady decision came well before the current reality of 
widespread, harsh collateral consequences. The problem is not 
only the flawed doctrinal origins of the collateral-consequences 
rule. It is also the development of that rule in a context that is 
now radically different, with myriad collateral consequences 
that affect individuals, families, and communities. The colla-
teral-consequences rule is outdated for three interrelated rea-
sons: (1) the rise in the percentage of criminal prosecutions that 
are resolved by guilty plea; (2) increased prosecution of minor 
offenses; and (3) the rise in the number and severity of colla-
teral consequences of criminal convictions. 
This country’s adversarial system of criminal justice cen-
ters on the tasks of negotiation and counseling, with the over-
whelming majority of defendants pleading guilty.145 While plea 
bargains have long existed,146 the percentage of cases resolved 
by guilty pleas has risen sharply in the past few decades.147 Be-
tween 1991 and 2001, for example, the proportion of guilty 
pleas rose by more than eleven percent.148 In the last five years 
of that period, “we have witnessed the rise to a bizarrely high 
plea rate. In some [federal] districts now, the percentage of 
convictions attributable to guilty pleas reaches over ninety-nine 
percent.”149 
Due to such phenomena as “zero-tolerance policing” and 
“broken windows” theory, misdemeanor and “quality of life” 
prosecutions have skyrocketed.150 Under the New York City Po-
 
draw the plea). 
 145. See supra note 59 (describing how ninety-seven percent of state con-
victions and ninety-six percent of federal convictions were secured by guilty 
pleas in 2004). 
 146. See generally George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE 
L.J. 857 (2000). 
 147. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge 
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003) (“The proportion of guilty pleas 
has been moving steadily upward for over thirty years, and has seen a dramat-
ic increase of over eleven percentage points just in the past ten years, from 
85.4% in 1991.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citation omitted). 
 150. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (introducing the “broken windows” theory); see al-
so Peter A. Barta, Note, Giuliani, Broken Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 168–69 (1999) (summarizing Mayor Gi-
uliani’s “zero-tolerance policing” tactics and their ill effects on New York City’s 
homeless population). But cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: 
THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6–7 (2001) (scrutinizing 
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lice Department’s “Clean Halls” program, for example, simple 
trespass arrests have risen a staggering twenty-five percent 
since 2002,151 at a time when crime in New York City is drop-
ping sharply.152 For many of these low-level prosecutions, the 
penal consequences are relatively minor, including time al-
ready served in jail, a fine, or community service. Yet a misde-
meanor conviction, or even a conviction for a noncriminal of-
fense,153 can lead to extremely harsh nonpenal consequences, 
including deportation and registration as a sex offender.154 
At the same time, collateral consequences have mu-
shroomed.155 They are also much more likely to be enforced.156 
 
the evidence and policy behind the “broken windows” theory). 
 151. M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands Up to the 
NYPD’s Apartheid-like Trespassing Crackdown, VILLAGE VOICE (New York 
City), Nov. 6, 2007, at 12. 
 152. N.Y. STATE DIV. CRIM. JUSTICE SERVS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
INDEX CRIMES REPORTED TO POLICE BY REGION: 1998-2007, http:// 
criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/indexcrimes/regiontotals.pdf (noting a 
thirty-eight percent decrease in FBI Index crimes between 1998 and 2007 in 
New York City). Jarrett Murphy notes the discrepancy in arrests: 
In an era of falling felony crime rates but rising arrest numbers, New 
York City’s courts are increasingly dealing with low-level misdemea-
nor offenses that years ago might never have led to arrest, arraign-
ment and bail. And at the same time, a growing litany of life conse-
quences—the loss of housing, ineligibility for some jobs, 
disqualification for government assistance—have been arrayed to tar-
get people found guilty even of petty crimes and noncriminal viola-
tions like disorderly conduct. People who get arrested today are likely 
to be accused of more minor crimes but face penalties for a conviction 
that go well beyond prison or probation. 
Jarrett Murphy, Awaiting Justice: The Punishing Price of NYC’s Bail System, 
CITY LIMITS INVESTIGATES, Fall 2007, at 6–7. 
 153. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2004) (defining “viola-
tion”). 
 154. See, e.g., KAREN J. TERRY & JOHN S. FURLONG, SEX OFFENDER REGIS-
TRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: A “MEGAN’S LAW” SOURCEBOOK (2d 
ed. 2006). 
 155. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND 
PRISONER REENTRY 9 (2003) (“Since 1980, the United States has passed do-
zens of laws restricting the kinds of jobs for which ex-prisoners can be hired, 
easing the requirements for their parental rights to be terminated, restricting 
their access to public welfare and housing subsidies, and limiting their right to 
vote.”); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for 
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
153, 154 (1999) (“In conjunction with the exponential increase in the number 
and length of incarcerative sentences during the last two decades, collateral 
sentencing consequences have contributed to exiling ex-offenders within their 
country, even after expiration of their maximum sentences.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1413 & n.6 (2005) (describing how deportations rose 
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This trend is particularly true for sex offenders. All fifty states 
and the District of Columbia now require people convicted of 
certain sex offenses to register with their local police depart-
ments.157 The passage of sex offender registry acts (SORAs) 
was spurred by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994,158 which linked federal funds to the estab-
lishment of registries.159 In 1996, Congress passed what is 
commonly known as “Megan’s Law” to require public notifica-
tion of information about certain people registered under SO-
RAs.160 The most recent development is the involuntary civil 
commitment of individuals convicted of qualifying sexual of-
fenses, with laws currently in twenty states and others pend-
ing.161 As of 2006, there is also federal money available “for the 
purpose of establishing, enhancing, or operating effective 
[state] civil commitment programs for sexually dangerous per-
sons.”162 
The combined effect of these three developments—higher 
rates of guilty pleas, an era of increasing adjudication of minor 
offenses, and increasing collateral consequences—creates a 
need for greater transparency in the plea bargain process. De-
fendants should be made aware of the myriad consequences of 
any guilty plea and, in particular, of the most serious conse-
quences. The collateral-consequences rule is particularly prob-
lematic when a defendant faces a relatively minor penal conse-
quence yet also faces, and is unaware of, an overwhelmingly 
more serious “collateral” consequence. 
 
from a total of 1,978 noncitizens in 1986 to almost 80,000 in 2003); see also id. 
at 1470 (noting how, since amendments to the federal higher education “law 
took effect in July 2000, more than 128,000 applicants have acknowledged a 
drug conviction on the [federal financial aid form] and have been denied aid as 
a result”). 
 157. See TERRY & FURLONG, supra note 154, at III-1, III-3 to III-4. 
 158. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Of-
fender Registration Program, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000 & Supp. 2006)). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2). 
 160. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (amending 42 
U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)). 
 161. See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex 
Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1 (“About 2,700 pedo-
philes, rapists and other sexual offenders are already being held indefinitely, 
mostly in special treatment centers, under so-called civil commitment pro-
grams . . . .”).  
 162. 42 U.S.C.A. § 16971 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). 
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II.  APPLYING THE COLLATERAL-CONSEQUENCES RULE 
TO SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACTS   
The harsh consequence of involuntary commitment under 
an SVPA starkly illustrates the problematic nature of the colla-
teral-consequences rule. This Part briefly explains the typical 
modern statute allowing for commitment of “sexually violent 
predators.” It then describes how most courts that have ex-
amined the duty to warn about an SVPA have applied the col-
lateral-consequences rule. 
A. A GROWING TREND: INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF 
“SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS” 
Involuntary commitment of people convicted of certain sex 
offenses has been described as “a growing national movement 
that is popular with politicians and voters.”163 Many states use 
the charged term “sexually violent predator” to describe com-
mitted individuals,164 and legislatures continue to enact these 
laws despite evidence that they are both extremely costly and 
do not adequately rehabilitate those committed.165 
In 1990, Washington became the first state to pass a mod-
ern law allowing for involuntary commitment of “sexually vio-
lent predators.”166 Other states quickly followed suit, and there 
are currently twenty states with some version of an SVPA.167 
These states now have approximately 2700 individuals commit-
ted, with over a thousand more detained while awaiting desig-
 
 163. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 161 (noting that, despite their popu-
larity, “such programs have almost never met a stated purpose of treating the 
worst criminals until they no longer pose a threat”). 
 164. Adam Deming, Civil Commitment Demographics and Characteristics, 
SEX OFFENDER L. REP., Apr.–May 2007, at 44 (noting that eleven states desig-
nate persons committed under the SVPA as a “sexually violent predator,” 
while the others use such terms as “sexually violent person,” or “sexually dan-
gerous individual”). 
 165. See Janus, supra note 29, at 1237 (“[T]he promise of treatment and 
time-limited confinement is belied by the almost nonexistent treatment grad-
uation rates in SVP programs across the country.”); see also  Abby Goodnough 
& Monica Davey, A Record of Failure at Center for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2007, at A1  (reporting how a New York sexual offender treatment 
center “failed to meet a central purpose: treating sex offenders so they would 
be well enough to return to society”). 
 166. See Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Invo-
luntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators–A Due Process Analysis, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 594, 611–15 (1997) (describing the passage of Washington’s 
law). 
 167. See Deming, supra note 23. 
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nation.168 While the number of people currently confined under 
SVPAs is relatively low, that could change with a single, highly 
publicized crime by someone who could have been involuntarily 
committed but was not.169 
Involuntary commitment of “sexually violent predators” is 
an expensive proposition, with more than $446 million bud-
geted in 2007 for all United States jurisdictions with SVPAs.170 
That number is up significantly from 2006, when total monies 
budgeted was approximately $276 million.171 In Washington 
State, the cost of commitment some six years after the SVPA 
took effect was more than $93,000 per person per year, at a to-
tal cost of more than $3.5 million per year.172 In Minnesota, the 
cost per resident is “about $130,000 a year, three times what it 
costs to treat them in a conventional prison.”173 
Historically speaking, the current SVPAs are not unique in 
singling out people convicted of sex offenses for confinement in 
the mental health system.174 For several decades beginning in 
the late 1930s, well over half of the states had some type of law 
 
 168. Deming, supra note 164, at 44 (listing survey results finding that, as 
of May 2006, there were 2627 civilly committed individuals in the seventeen 
states with SVPAs at that time, and another 1019 civilly detained individu-
als); see also Davey & Goodnough, supra note 161 (listing similar numbers for 
2008). 
 169. See, e.g., Larry Oakes, OK’d for Transfer, but Going Nowhere, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 11, 2008, at A1 (“[After] a sex offender re-
leased from prison murdered 22-year-old Dru Sjodin of Pequot Lakes, . . . Gov. 
Tim Pawlenty prohibited releases from the [Minnesota sex offender facility] 
unless required by law or ordered by a court. Pawlenty’s order remains in ef-
fect.”); Jonathan Saltzman, Push Is On to Keep Sex Criminals Locked Up, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2005, at A1 (noting that the number of petitions filed 
under the state’s “Sexually Dangerous Persons” act “has risen sharply, from 
75 in 2003 to 124 in 2004,” with 157 petitions pending as of October 2007 and 
stating that “[i]n large part, court officials trace the increase to the outcry that 
followed the murder of 30-year-old Alexandra Zapp, who was killed by a con-
victed sex offender in a Burger King restroom . . . in 2002”). 
 170. Deming, supra note 23, at 6. 
 171. Deming, supra note 164, at 44 (noting that this “figure relates only to 
money spent on the civil commitment programs and not additional money 
spent in each state on prosecuting (and defending) these cases at trial, and 
other overhead the states incur associated with having a civil commitment 
program”); COMPARING STATE LAWS, supra note 115, at 1 (estimating the cost 
of operating secure facilities for SVPs in the United States to be $224 million 
per annum). 
 172. La Fond, Costs, supra note 29, at 478. 
 173. Larry Oakes, Locked in Limbo, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 
8, 2008, at A1. 
 174. See La Fond, Costs, supra note 29, at 469–70 (discussing 1930s “sex-
ual psychopath statutes”). 
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allowing for the placement of those convicted of sex offenses in 
psychiatric institutions rather than in prisons.175 These early 
statutes differed in at least one significant respect, however, 
from the current crop of SVPAs: they substituted treatment for 
imprisonment, rather than tacking on involuntary commitment 
after prison.176 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutio-
nality of modern SVPAs in Kansas v. Hendricks.177 It found 
that, because the Kansas SVPA required findings of both dan-
gerousness and mental abnormality, it was similar to non-sex-
offense-based civil commitment statutes in the narrowness of 
its scope.178 The law had sufficient procedural and evidentiary 
safeguards for what the Court recognized as “the core of the li-
berty protected by the Due Process Clause,” namely, freedom 
from physical restraint.179 The Court also rejected Hendricks’ 
arguments that the law violated both ex post facto and double 
jeopardy prohibitions, finding that involuntary commitment 
was intended to incapacitate and treat those who are commit-
ted, not punish them.180 Confinement under a properly tailored 
SVPA is thus a civil action, and not criminal punishment.181 
This is despite the fact that, as Justice Kennedy put it in his 
Hendricks concurrence, “[n]otwithstanding its civil attributes, 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 470–71. Compare Butler v. Burke, 360 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 
1966) (describing how the defendant was committed for treatment shortly af-
ter entering a guilty plea) with Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353–54 
(1997) (describing how Hendricks was committed after serving his ten-year 
sentence). 
 177. 521 U.S. at 357 (finding that it “cannot be said that the involuntary 
civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our 
understanding of ordered liberty”). 
 178. Id. at 357–58. 
 179. Id. at 356–57. 
 180. Id. at 360–71; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (hold-
ing that “respondent cannot obtain release through an ‘as-applied’ challenge to 
the Washington [SVPA] on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds”). In 
2002, the Court revisited SVPAs, holding that the state must show “proof of 
serious difficulty in controlling behavior” for those it seeks to civilly commit. 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (noting, however, that the state 
need not prove absolute lack of ability to control behavior). 
 181. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (stating that the Court was “unpersuaded 
by Hendricks’ argument that Kansas has established criminal proceedings”). 
The Court noted that the Kansas legislature labeled its SVPA as civil, situat-
ing it within its civil probate code. Id. In addition, the Court found that the 
Act’s purpose was neither retribution nor deterrence, and it was not punitive 
even though its primary purpose may have been to incapacitate rather than 
treat sex offenders. Id. at 361–69. 
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the practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose con-
finement for life.”182 
The Kansas SVPA is typical of such statutes.183 Under the 
Act, the state must make two showings in order to commit an 
individual. It must show that the individual (1) has a “mental 
abnormality” or suffers from a “personality disorder,” and (2) is 
likely to engage in “repeat acts of sexual violence.”184 Only 
those convicted of or charged with a “sexually violent offense” 
qualify as sexually violent predators.185 The list of qualifying 
crimes is extensive, ranging from rape to attempted aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child.186 There is also a category for 
any nonsexual offense “which either at the time of sentencing 
for the offense or subsequently during involuntary commitment 
proceedings pursuant to this act, has been determined beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated.”187 In other 
words, a person can be deemed a sexually violent predator even 
if the underlying charge or conviction is not a sexual offense. 
This widens considerably the potential pool of candidates for 
involuntary commitment.188 
The rate of release for those committed under an SVPA is 
very low. Every SVPA allows for indefinite confinement with 
periodic review.189 In December 2004, seventeen states had 
SVPAs and almost all of them had been in effect since 1999 or 
earlier.190 In these states at that time, 3493 people had been 
committed or held for evaluation as sexually violent predators; 
only 427 had ever been discharged or released for outpatient 
treatment.191 Four of the SVPA states have never released a 
 
 182. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 183. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 to -29a22 (2005 & Supp. 2007); see 
also La Fond, Costs, supra note 29, at 469 n.8 (stating that the Hendricks 
Court’s explanation of the Kansas SVPA “is a useful description that accurate-
ly describes in general terms how these laws work”). 
 184. § 59-29a01. 
 185. § 59-29a02(a) (defining “sexually violent predator”). 
 186. § 59-29a02(e). 
 187. § 59-29a02(e)(13). 
 188. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing nonsexual offenses). 
 189. See Kendall & Cheung, supra note 29, at 49–52 tbl.2 (listing the 
length of commitment for each state). 
 190. See KATHY GOOKIN, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVO-
LUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, RE-
VISED, 3 (2007), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf. 
 191. See COMPARING STATE LAWS, supra note 115, at 1–2 (“[The report] 
use[s] the term ‘held since the law went into effect’ rather than ‘committed,’ 
because it provides a more accurate reflection of the scope of the law’s applica-
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single person.192 Of the 129 people committed under the Kansas 
SVPA between its 1994 passage and 2004, only eighteen have 
been discharged or released from confinement into a less re-
strictive environment. Of these, fourteen were sent back.193 In 
short, “[c]ivil commitment for sexual dangerousness is, as a 
practical matter, a life sentence.”194 
Even sex offenders who are not involuntarily committed 
face their own form of banishment.195 They are subject to zon-
 
tion. In many states, individuals are sent to the treatment facility for evalua-
tion and may choose to wait some time before proceeding with the commit-
ment hearing.”). The numbers reported in a 2007 New York Times investiga-
tion into SVPAs were even more stark:  
Nearly 3,000 sex offenders have been committed since the first law 
passed in 1990. In 18 of the 19 states, about 50 have been released 
completely from commitment because clinicians or state-appointed 
evaluators deemed them ready. Some 115 other people have been sent 
home because of legal technicalities, court rulings, terminal illness or 
old age. 
Davey & Goodnough, supra note 161; see also Oakes, supra note 169 (noting 
how Minnesota had a political appointee making release decisions, how the 
SVP population ballooned, and how “[b]ecause no one can guarantee an of-
fender won’t rape or molest again, the safest course . . . has been to keep of-
fenders locked up regardless of how their treatment has progressed”). 
 192. Oakes, supra note 169; see also Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Vi-
olence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Com-
mitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 206 (1996) (noting how, under Minnesota’s precur-
sor statute to its modern SVPA, not a single person convicted of a sex offense 
and then civilly committed was ever released). 
 193. COMPARING STATE LAWS, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1. Although Com-
paring State Laws does not detail the basis for these fourteen remands back 
into secure confinement, most SVPAs are quite permissive in this respect. In 
Kansas, for example: 
At any time during which the person is in the transitional release 
program and the treatment staff determines that the person has vi-
olated any rule, regulation or directive associated with the transition-
al release program, the treatment staff may remove the person from 
the transitional release program and return the person to the secure 
commitment facility. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08(f ) (2005 & Supp. 2007). At the hearing that oc-
curs shortly after remand, “[t]he attorney general shall have the burden of 
proof to show probable cause that the person violated conditions of transitional 
release.” § 59-29a08(g). 
 194. Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 26, at 1. But see Carty v. Nelson, 
426 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that, after the state had won civil 
commitment of Carty for two consecutive two-year periods after he completed 
his criminal sentence, “a jury found that Carty should no longer be civilly 
committed under the SVP Act”). 
 195. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: 
Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007) (dis-
cussing the growing movement by municipalities to create zones excluding 
convicted sex offenders). 
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ing rules about where they may or may not live,196 registration 
rules that can include internet postings of their photographs 
and addresses even for juvenile convictions,197 and numerous 
bars on employment.198 Perhaps more than any other type of 
conviction, a sexual-offense conviction (even for some misde-
meanors), follows a person for life.199  
Involuntary commitment is both incarceration and exile. 
Although the Supreme Court has deemed the commitment of 
“sexually violent predators” to be nonpunitive in nature,200 in 
some of the SVPA states, commitment takes place in a state 
prison or in a facility managed by the state’s department of cor-
rections.201 The person who finds himself securely locked up 
 
 196. See, e.g., Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2007, at A22 (describing how local laws restricting where convicted sex of-
fenders may live have forced five men to live under a bridge); Jennifer Fusco, 
Stricter Rules for Sex Offenders Approved, UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, Oct. 
10, 2007, (discussing local law that prohibits convicted sex offenders from be-
ing within 1500 feet of a county park, playground, school, or child-care center); 
Aimee Harris, Newton Considering Sex Offender Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2007, New Jersey and the Region, 2 (discussing proposal to ban “high risk” sex 
offenders from living anywhere within city limits). 
 197. See, e.g., Delaware Sex Offender Central Registry, http://sexoffender 
.dsp.delaware.gov/cgi-bin/sexoff.cgi/d?opt=00002826 (last visited Nov. 7, 2008) 
(posting photograph, address, and place of employment, among other informa-
tion, for an individual who was convicted of a sexual offense shortly after his 
fourteenth birthday). 
 198. See Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Reg-
istration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 67, 75 tbl.2 (2005) (noting how at least 
one-quarter of registrants reported receiving harassing or threatening mail 
and telephone calls, losing a job, being denied a promotion at work, losing (or 
being unable to obtain) a place to live, being treated rudely in public, being 
harassed or threatened in person, and losing at least one friend); Richard 
Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of Registered Female Sex Offenders, 68 
FED. PROBATION 30, 32 tbl.3, 33 (2004) (describing research that makes it 
“clear that registered female sex offenders frequently experience collateral 
consequences that may have serious deleterious effects on their social, eco-
nomic, and physical well-being” and specifically noting that forty-five percent 
of surveyed women who had been on registry for thirty-two months or more 
reported having lost a job due to registration). For further examples of the my-
riad consequences that individuals convicted of sex offenses face, see Richard 
Gonzales, Iris Scanning Tracks Sex Offenders, NPR LEGAL AFFAIRS, Dec. 3, 
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16827587. 
 199. See generally Yung, supra note 195 (discussing meanings of exile, ba-
nishment, and commitment). 
 200. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1997) (“[C]ommitment 
under the Act does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of crimi-
nal punishment: retribution or deterrence.”). 
 201. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(c) (2005 & Supp. 2007) (describ-
ing how people subject to SVPA can be confined by the secretary of corrections 
so long as they are “housed and managed separately from offenders in the cus-
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and designated as a sexual violent predator will experience it 
as quite similar to incarceration, and therefore punishment.202  
B. NO DUTY TO WARN ABOUT COMMITMENT AS A “SEXUALLY 
VIOLENT PREDATOR” 
Although the number of people confined as sexually violent 
predators remains small, many of them will never be released. 
In addition to the criminal sanctions that these individuals 
served, they face potential lifetime commitment under the 
SVPA in their respective states. This poses the central issue 
explored in this Article: should these individuals have the right 
to be informed about the possibility of lifelong involuntary 
commitment during the plea process? The answer provided by 
the current collateral-consequences paradigm is an unsettling 
“no.” This is true when courts have considered both due process 
and ineffective assistance challenges. This section thus consid-
ers the constitutional analysis for guilty pleas, set out more 
generally in Part I, in the particular context of courts’ reason-
ing and the outcomes in cases involving the right to preplea 
knowledge about an SVPA. 
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the 
issue of whether the Constitution requires that a defendant be 
told that his guilty plea might lead to involuntary commit-
ment.203 Some state courts, however, have treated the civil-
 
tody of the secretary of corrections, and except for occasional instances of su-
pervised incidental contact, shall be segregated from such offenders”); Davey 
& Goodnough, supra note 161 (“Most of the centers tend to look and feel like 
prisons, with clanking double doors, guard stations, fluorescent lighting, cin-
derblock walls, overcrowded conditions and tall fences with razor wire around 
the perimeters. Bedroom doors are often locked at night, and mail is searched 
by the staff for pornography or retail catalogs with pictures of women or child-
ren. Most states put their centers in isolated areas.”). But see id. (“Yet sooth-
ing artwork hangs at some centers, and cheerful fliers announce movie nights 
and other activities. The residents can wander the grounds and often spend 
their time as they please in an effort to encourage their cooperation, including 
sunbathing in courtyards and sometimes even ordering pizza for delivery. The 
new center in California will have a 20,000-book library, badminton courts 
and room for music and art therapy.”); Deming, supra note 23, at 8 (noting 
that states take varying approaches to the facilities they use for SVP commit-
ment). 
 202. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 161. 
 203. Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court 
has not addressed whether a defendant has a constitutional right to be in-
formed, before pleading guilty, of the possibility of being deemed a sexually 
dangerous person.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to undertake review 
of any lower court finding that a defendant had no constitutional right to be 
warned of a “collateral” consequence of his criminal conviction. See supra note 
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criminal distinction from Kansas v. Hendricks as analogous to 
the direct-collateral distinction set out in the collateral-
consequences rule and have thus found no duty to warn about 
involuntary commitment.204 If the Supreme Court ever adopted 
this approach, presumably it would also find no duty to 
warn.205 
Unlike deportation, the duty to warn about involuntary 
commitment as a consequence of sex offense convictions has not 
been extensively litigated in the lower federal courts.206 A 
 
65 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra Part I.B.1.b.ii (describing how Texas’s highest court for 
criminal appeals required that a consequence must be both “direct” and “puni-
tive” in order to warrant warnings under the Due Process Clause); see also 
Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
“designating an offender to be a sexual predator after he or she has entered a 
plea bargain does not constitute a breach of contract because the sexual preda-
tor designation is not a form of punishment”); In re Detention of Bailey, 740 
N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Bussell v. State, 963 P.2d 1250, 1254 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
 205. This is likely, at the very least, on due process grounds. There is a 
compelling argument that defense counsel should be treated differently from 
the trial court, and thus ineffective assistance claims should be treated diffe-
rently from due process claims in the failure to warn context. See supra Part 
I.B.2. Indeed, the Supreme Court indicated as much in INS v. St. Cyr by as-
suming that “alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agree-
ment are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.” 
533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001). It noted, however, that “[e]ven if the defendant were 
not initially aware of [the federal statute governing relief from deportation], 
competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, 
would have advised him concerning the provision’s importance.” Id. at 323 
n.50. Still, the Court might not apply this same analysis to involuntary com-
mitment as an SVP. This is because deportation, in the wake of amendments 
in and after 1996, is basically mandatory for a large list of convictions, with 
very little if any room for discretionary relief. See infra note 224. In that way, 
deportation is distinguishable from commitment under any SVPA, which all 
have a separate process that gives the judge or jury the power to determine if 
commitment is necessary. See supra notes 183–188 and accompanying text 
(describing the SVPA process). 
 206. See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (citing cases from 
numerous circuit courts finding deportation to be a collateral consequence). 
But see Steele, 365 F.3d at 17 (considering the Massachusetts SVPA). The 
dearth of federal cases examining the right to warning about an SVPA is likely 
due to the fact that the vast majority of crimes are prosecuted in state courts 
and would be reviewed in federal court only on writs of habeas corpus. This 
requires exhaustion of both the direct appeal and the state collateral review 
processes and so comes years after the state court conviction. Since many 
SVPAs are relatively new, and since many confinements are also fairly recent, 
it could simply be that these cases have not yet arrived in great numbers in 
the federal courts. Nevertheless, defendants who challenge their convictions in 
federal court through writs of habeas corpus face increasingly complex proce-
dural hurdles. In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
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number of state courts, however, have addressed the issue, 
reaching the same conclusion as the Steele v. Murphy court 
(discussed in the Introduction): a plea is valid even though the 
person pleading guilty did not know that the conviction for a 
sexual offense could lead to involuntary commitment after 
completion of the criminal sentence.207 These cases generally 
arise when a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea on 
the grounds that neither the judge nor defense counsel told him 
about the SVPA. Almost all of the decisions deny, on various 
grounds, the request to withdraw the plea. Some courts base 
their holdings on due process grounds;208 some reject claims 
that counsel offered ineffective assistance in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment by failing to warn;209 and still others incor-
porate a traditional contract analysis in rejecting the claim that 
failure to inform about involuntary commitment is a breach of 
the plea bargain agreement.210 
State v. Myers illustrates the general approach to due 
process and knowledge of an SVPA during the guilty plea 
 
Congress withdrew from federal judges the power to grant writs unless a 
state-court adjudication on the merits was made, inter alia, “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(2000). The practical—indeed, intended—effect of this law has been to reduce 
the likelihood that defendants who are convicted in the state court system will 
be able to have their cases heard in Article III courts. 
 207. See Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 804–05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Harris, 881 So. 2d 1079, 1082–85 (Fla. 2004); Matter of Hay, 953 P.2d 
666, 676 (Kan. 1998); Morales v. State, 104 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2003); Ames v. Johnson, No. CL04-413, 2005 WL 820305 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 
2005); In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 780–81 (Wash. 1999) (en 
banc). 
 208. See, e.g., Martin, 987 P.2d at 806 (“The rationale is that one who 
pleads guilty should be informed of the punishment that must be imposed so 
that he can make an intelligent and knowing plea. Here, confinement for 
treatment under the [Sexually Violent Persons] Act is not ‘punishment,’ nor 
must it be imposed. Therefore, there was no requirement that Petitioners be 
told of the Act’s terms before they pled guilty.” (citation omitted)). 
 209. See, e.g., Morales, 104 S.W.3d at 437 (finding that “counsel did not 
render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform movant of the col-
lateral consequence of involuntary commitment” under the state’s SVPA). 
 210. See, e.g., Harris, 881 So. 2d at 1082–85 (rejecting respondent’s breach 
of contract argument by concluding that “any bargain that a defendant may 
strike in a plea agreement in a criminal case would have no bearing on a sub-
sequent involuntary commitment for control, care, and treatment” and also 
holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not prohibit the govern-
ment from initiating involuntary commitment proceedings even where there 
was no mention of this in the plea agreement (quoting Murray v. Regier, 872 
So. 2d 217, 224 (Fla. 2002))). 
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process.211 Robert Myers pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a 
child. He later moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that 
it was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial 
court had failed to inform him about Wisconsin’s Sexually Vio-
lent Persons Commitment law.212 The court noted that involun-
tary commitment would not automatically flow from the fact of 
Myers’s conviction. Instead, “Myers will have the full benefit of 
the [commitment law’s] procedures, due process, and an inde-
pendent trial.”213 Since commitment was thus only a potential 
future consequence of his plea, Myers had no due process right 
to know about it prior to entering his plea.214 
With respect to ineffective assistance of counsel, a Kansas 
Court of Appeals case demonstrates the typical outcome. Ri-
chard Bussell pleaded guilty to a sexual offense in exchange for 
a sentence of six to fifteen years.215 The court found that Bus-
sell was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea despite the fact 
that his attorney had failed to advise him about potential con-
finement under the Kansas SVPA.216 The court first noted the 
two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel, which looks 
at both attorney competence and prejudice to the defendant.217 
With respect to the first prong, the court emphasized the “high-
ly deferential” nature of judicial scrutiny of defense counsel’s 
performance.218 It went on to apply the circular reasoning that, 
because defense counsel must warn only about possible crimi-
nal penalties, there was no duty to warn about the Kansas 
SVPA.219 On the second prong, the court found that because 
Bussell did not “flatly state that his decision to plead guilty 
would have changed had he known of the KSVPA,” he failed to 
 
 211. 544 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
 212. Id. at 610. 
 213. Id. at 610–11. 
 214. Id. at 611. 
 215. Bussell v. State, 963 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). The actual 
sentence was two to five years on each count, to be served consecutively on 
three counts and concurrently on the others. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1254. The court also denied Bussell’s claim that the trial court’s 
failure to warn about the SVPA violated due process. Id. at 1252–53 (applying 
the collateral-consequences rule to Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predators Act 
and noting that, because commitment under the SVPA did not flow imme-
diately, definitely, and automatically from the guilty plea, the trial court had 
no duty to warn defendant about it). 
 217. Id. at 1252–53; see supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing 
the test). 
 218. Bussell, 963 P.2d at 1253–54. 
 219. Id. at 1254.  
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show that the failure to warn about the SVPA prejudiced 
him.220 
Also noteworthy to the court was the fact that Bussell’s 
plea allowed him to avoid a substantially longer sentence.221 
The court was “not willing to assume that [the] defendant [was] 
so lacking in judgment that he would have risked a much long-
er sentence by going to trial if he had known that sometime in 
the distant future the KSVPA might have been applied to 
him.”222 In other words, the court came to the somewhat sur-
prising conclusion that the risk of potential lifelong involuntary 
commitment would not deter Bussell from pleading guilty, even 
though he rationally exercised that same judgment to avoid a 
longer prison sentence by pleading guilty. 
The Myers approach utterly fails to consider the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person, charged with a crime, in determin-
ing the need for knowledge before pleading guilty. The Bussell 
decision is naïve at best, and perhaps disingenuous, about the 
importance that involuntary commitment as a sexually violent 
predator plays in decision making about whether to plead 
guilty or go to trial. Both cases evidence a formalistic approach 
where the line between “direct” and “collateral” is divorced 
from the need for transparency in the plea process. 
III.  INTRODUCING A REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
FOR THE DUTY TO WARN: CONSIDERING 
CONSEQUENCES FROM THE DEFENDANT’S 
PERSPECTIVE   
A. PROPOSAL: RULE OF REASONABLENESS FOR WARNINGS, WITH 
SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCE AS TOUCHSTONE 
This section proposes a reasonableness standard in deter-
mining whether there should be a due process duty to warn a 
defendant about a particular consequence prior to a guilty plea. 
Under this standard, warnings must be given whenever a rea-
sonable person in the defendant’s situation would deem know-
ledge of the consequence a significant factor in deciding wheth-
 
 220. Id. at 1254. The court also noted that because the Kansas SVPA al-
lowed for confinement of even those simply charged with crimes, the guilty 
plea “did not change that status and, from that point of view, it is difficult to 
see where defendant can show any prejudice in the trial court’s failure to ad-
vise him of the consequences of the KSVPA.” Id. at 1253. 
 221. Id. at 1254. 
 222. Id. 
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er to plead guilty. What would a reasonable person facing these 
criminal charges, potential criminal punishment, “collateral” 
consequences, and plea bargain offers need to know? It is only 
when this critical perspective is introduced that the right to a 
voluntary, knowing guilty plea begins to make sense. Putting 
the defendant back into the mix gives meaning to the constitu-
tional protections surrounding guilty pleas. 
The touchstone for gauging the significance of a particular 
consequence to the plea decision-making process would be the 
severity of that consequence. If a consequence is severe, then it 
is something that any reasonable defendant would use as a sig-
nificant factor in deciding whether to plead guilty. This is true 
even if it is not certain that the consequence will come to 
pass.223 As a secondary factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of warning about a particular consequence, courts should 
consider if the consequence is highly likely to apply in deciding 
if it too merits advisement. Likelihood is high when the fact of 
conviction serves as the sole and nondiscretionary predicate for 
imposition of the consequence.224 This might result in warnings 
about some collateral consequences that are not at the highest 
end of the spectrum of severity. However, it is not onerous to 
warn about these since they will be limited in number, and de-
fense counsel and the court should, due to their automatic na-
ture, be aware of them.225 
This proposed standard involves an objective, rather than a 
subjective, inquiry. This avoids the difficulties of administra-
tion that a subjective standard would present, and it also more 
closely tracks the ways in which courts have approached such 
inquiries in other areas of constitutional criminal procedure. 
 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 221–222 (discussing the Bussell 
court’s failure to recognize this reality). 
 224. The term “highly likely to apply” is more appropriate here than “cer-
tain.” While some consequences are 100 percent likely to result from the fact of 
conviction, others have a likelihood of application that is still quite high, but 
somewhat below certainty. An example would be deportation, where there are 
still some extremely limited exceptions to the 1996 federal immigration law, 
which states that any person convicted of a crime that qualifies an as “aggra-
vated felony” is mandatorily deportable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) 
(stating that there is no discretionary relief from exclusion for those convicted 
of aggravated felonies); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that 
the 1996 immigration law does not apply retroactively to all cases, and that 
discretionary relief from deportation “remains available for aliens, like res-
pondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, 
notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [statutory] re-
lief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect”). 
 225. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing likelihood factor in more detail). 
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This reasonableness proposal reenvisions the current due 
process approach to information in the plea-bargain process. A 
more rigorous due process standard for warnings would apply 
to both the courts and defense counsel, with the goal of having 
courts ensure that defendants receive information about severe 
or certain consequences. It thus has implications for the right 
to effective assistance of counsel as well as due process. This is 
not to say that defense counsel, who must also deliver effective 
assistance under the Sixth Amendment, has an obligation to 
disclose information identical to that of the judge under the due 
process standard. As a number of courts and commentators 
have noted, counsel is best situated to offer defendants infor-
mation on collateral consequences.226 Although effective assis-
tance standards might require warnings in a particular case 
above and beyond those of a due process reasonableness ap-
proach, a broader conception of due process in guilty pleas 
would also apply to defense counsel and would require that 
courts ensure defense counsel’s compliance with the critical 
need for information about certain collateral consequences.227 
Thus, a reasonableness approach to due process standards go-
verning a person’s right to information would be a floor above 
which the norm for effective assistance in this same area 
should rest. 
A reasonableness approach injects the perspective of the 
individual charged with the crime, and facing the constitution-
ally protected plea decision, into a standard from which it is 
otherwise completely absent, having been eclipsed by the colla-
teral-consequences rule’s singular concern with the finality of 
guilty pleas and the efficiency of the system that accepts so 
many. Professor Kit Kinports, in a thorough exploration of the 
different perspectives from which the Supreme Court views 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, argues that “the 
Court should adopt a principled, consistent approach to the 
question of perspective, based on the interests a particular con-
stitutional protection is designed to further.”228 If the central 
 
 226. See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 68; see also supra notes 125–137 
and accompanying text. 
 227. Such judicial oversight is particularly important given the ongoing 
crisis in indigent defense. See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID 
AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTIN-
UING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf; Klein, supra note 
109; Note, supra note 109. 
 228. Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRI-
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purpose of a particular constitutional rule “is to preserve a 
criminal defendant’s right to make a free and unconstrained 
choice,” Kinports would apply what she terms a “consent mod-
el.”229 Under this model: 
[T]he Court should focus on the defendant’s perspective, applying a 
subjective standard and examining the decision made by the particu-
lar defendant to ensure that it was truly voluntary. The Court may 
prefer an objective ‘reasonable defendant’ standard in some cases, in 
the interest of ensuring that the reach of constitutional rights ‘does 
not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual,’ but the 
emphasis should remain on the defendant’s point of view.230 
Following Kinports’s framework, a consent model would 
apply to the duty to warn about collateral consequences. This is 
because the purposes behind the constitutional norms relevant 
to the plea process relate to a defendant’s right to awareness of 
the ramifications of the criminal conviction. A core purpose of 
due process is to ensure that the defendant knows what he is 
doing when he enters a guilty plea. The core purpose of the 
right to counsel is to ensure that each person charged with a 
crime and facing potential jail time has a skilled advocate to 
guide him through the complex criminal justice system. Look-
ing at these two interrelated purposes from the perspective of 
the defendant—the intended beneficiary of these two constitu-
tional rights—and in the context of today’s harsh world of colla-
teral consequences, it is difficult to justify the collateral-
consequences rule. 
As the “reasonableness standard” language makes clear, 
the significance of the consequence would be viewed from the 
(objective) perspective of the person facing the plea decision-
making process. In numerous areas of constitutional criminal 
procedure, courts analyze issues from the perspective of the de-
fendant.231 Often, this manifests itself as a “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test that views matters as a reasonable defendant 
(or even as the particular defendant) would view them. For ex-
ample, a due process analysis of the voluntariness of a defen-
dant’s confession considers the surrounding facts and circums-
tances, including the length and location of the interrogation 
 
MINOLOGY 71, 71 (2007). 
 229. Id. at 72, 76. 
 230. Id. at 76 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)). 
 231. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 228, at 73–74 (examining search and 
seizure as well as confession cases, and noting how the Court’s “criminal pro-
cedure jurisprudence . . . tends to shift opportunistically from case to case be-
tween subjective and objective standards, and between whose point of view—
the police officer’s or the defendant’s—it considers controlling”). 
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and the defendant’s access to friends and family.232 The partic-
ular defendant’s situation can also be relevant, and courts have 
factored things such as physical injury and mental illness into 
the voluntariness calculus.233 Both confessions and guilty pleas 
involve the waiver of the right against self-incrimination, and 
both should be analyzed similarly, on the basis of the totality of 
the surrounding circumstances. 
The Supreme Court also looks at the facts and circums-
tances in other areas. For example, in 2007 the Court an-
nounced a “reasonable passenger” standard in holding that 
someone in a car that the police have stopped is “seized” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes and is thus entitled to challenge 
the constitutionality of the car stop.234 In Brendlin v. Califor-
nia, the Court “ask[ed] whether a reasonable person in [the de-
fendant’s] position when the car stopped would have believed 
himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the police and 
himself.”235 While this is an objective test in that it considers 
the beliefs of a reasonable defendant rather than the particular 
defendant, it takes the objective facts and circumstances of the 
particular defendant’s situation into account.236 This avoids the 
 
 232. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1963) (consi-
dering the length of detention and Haynes’ inability to contact his wife in de-
termining that confession violated due process); see also Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (noting how, although the Court’s focus in ex-
amining the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating statements has shifted to 
the Fifth Amendment with the decisions in Malloy and Miranda, “[w]e have 
never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude 
confessions that were obtained involuntarily”). The Court has applied the 
same type of standard for consent-to-search cases. See Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) (noting how “it is only by analyzing all the 
circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in 
fact it was voluntary or coerced,” and characterizing the inquiry as a “careful 
sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case”). 
 233. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 62, at 321; cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an indi-
vidual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s 
state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.”). 
 234. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2402 (2007). 
 235. Id. at 2406 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). In 
examining the concept of reasonableness more generally, in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that it has “measured in objective terms 
by examining the totality of the circumstances. In applying this test we have 
consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific 
nature of the reasonableness inquiry.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996) (rejecting argument that lawfully seized person must be warned that he 
is “free to go” before his consent to search can be voluntary). 
 236. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2407 n.4 (“The test is not what Brendlin felt 
but what a reasonable passenger would have understood.”); see also id. at 2408 
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difficulties of administering a subjective standard yet retains a 
fact-sensitive (rather than a bright-line) inquiry. Indeed, in re-
jecting the state’s argument that the police officers did not in-
tend to seize the passenger, the Brendlin Court noted that 
“[t]he intent that counts under the Fourth Amendment is the 
intent that has been conveyed to the person confronted, and the 
criterion of willful restriction on freedom of movement is no in-
vitation to look to subjective intent when determining who is 
seized.”237 Similarly, what counts in the plea decision-making 
process is the significance of the information—or lack thereof—
that has been conveyed to the person who must make the deci-
sion, and who must do it voluntarily, with knowledge and with 
the assistance of effective counsel. 
Even Miranda, with its bright-line, prophylactic rule re-
quiring a specific set of warnings prior to any custodial interro-
gation, uses a fact-specific inquiry.238 And it does so, at least for 
part of the test, from a defendant’s perspective. Thus, the cus-
tody prerequisite to Miranda warnings is satisfied if a reasona-
ble person in the defendant’s position would not feel free to 
leave.239 This objective inquiry considers the particular (exter-
nal) facts and circumstances of the defendant’s situation, in-
cluding the place and length of detention, any physical re-
straints on the defendant’s person, and the number of police 
officers present.240 In theory, these warnings are designed so 
that a person in custody knows that he can refuse to speak with 
the authorities or can request a lawyer before doing so. In the 
same way, an appropriate rule governing warnings about con-
sequences would allow defendants to plead guilty, or not, based 
on full information about the true meaning of the resulting 
conviction. 
 
(critiquing the California Supreme Court’s “view of the facts [as] ignor[ing] the 
objective Mendenhall test of what a reasonable passenger would understand”). 
However, it is difficult to apply a purely objective standard, as subjective ele-
ments often creep into this analysis. See generally Kinports, supra note 228 
(offering various instances where the Supreme Court used “subjective” ele-
ments in purportedly “objective” analysis). 
 237. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2409 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
 239. Id. at 444, 469. 
 240. See, e.g., Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441–42 (1984) (reject-
ing a categorical rule for car stops in favor of a rule considering particular cir-
cumstances to determine if a person stopped is “in custody”); Oregon v. Ma-
thiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1977) (finding that burglary suspect was not 
“in custody” after considering place and length of detention, as well as the fact 
that police informed suspect that he was not under arrest). 
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In some respects, the constitutional doctrine surrounding 
guilty pleas already takes the defendant’s perspective, as well 
as the circumstances surrounding the plea, into account. In 
Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court noted how guilty 
pleas are a “grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care 
and discernment . . . .”241 In recognizing the need for special 
scrutiny of guilty pleas taken when a defendant is unrepre-
sented by counsel, Brady observed that “an intelligent assess-
ment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently 
impossible without the assistance of an attorney . . . .”242 This 
acknowledges that a defendant’s understanding of the pros and 
cons of any guilty plea is a value deserving of constitutional 
protection. The Court later stated that “[t]he voluntariness of 
Brady’s plea can be determined only by considering all of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding it.”243 This explicitly relies 
on a fact-sensitive analysis and should extend to the duty to 
warn. 
Yet contrary to all of these analogous areas, the current 
law of warnings about collateral consequences considers only 
whether a particular consequence flows “directly and automati-
cally” from the conviction, is penal in nature, or is under the 
“control and responsibility” of the trial court.244 It is difficult to 
envision how this advances the value of ensuring that defen-
dants have knowledge of the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of pleading guilty. Instead, it is a rule separated from its 
underlying purpose and works only to place strict limits on the 
constitutionally mandated amount of information that must go 
to a defendant who pleads guilty, in a focused yet misguided at-
tempt to protect the finality and efficiency of guilty pleas. 
1. Severity of Consequence 
Consequences that fit squarely into the high end of the se-
verity spectrum would be those that infringe upon the defen-
dant’s life, liberty, or such fundamental rights as parenting245 
 
 241. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 242. Id. at 748 n.6 (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. at 749; see also Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“Whether a plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily is determined 
from ‘all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.’” (quoting Brady, 397 
U.S. at 749)). 
 244. See supra Part I.B.1.b (discussing various definitions of “direct conse-
quences”). 
 245. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (recognizing the “fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
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or the ability to travel.246 Taking severity into account is criti-
cal, as any reasonable person facing a guilty plea decision 
would treat as a significant factor any consequence that might 
lead, for example, to potential lifelong involuntary commitment 
or deportation to a country where he faced likely incarceration 
or even execution.247 Under this inquiry, such consequences 
would qualify for warnings. 
There is precedent in the use of severity as a central factor 
in determining constitutional criminal procedural rights. In-
deed, one state high court has treated severity as a touchstone 
in determining the duty to warn about consequences.248 Jerry 
L. Bellamy was convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual con-
tact after accepting a plea bargain in which more serious 
charges were dismissed and the government recommended an 
eighteen-month jail sentence.249 At the time of his sentencing, 
he had slightly more than two months left to serve.250 One 
week before his release, the government sought to commit Bel-
lamy under New Jersey’s Sexually Violent Predator Act 
(SVPA), using the sexual misconduct conviction as the required 
“sexually violent offense” under the Act.251 This petition was ul-
timately successful, and Bellamy was involuntarily commit-
ted.252 He then sought to withdraw his guilty plea on due 
process and ineffective assistance grounds, arguing that nei-
ther the trial court nor defense counsel warned him about the 
SVPA prior to his plea.253 
 
control of their children”). 
 246. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (recognizing the fundamen-
tal right of citizens to travel within the United States). 
 247. There may be limits on some such deportations. Refugee and asylum 
law principles prohibit the United States government from deporting someone 
to a country if that person can demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution if returned to that county, and if the persecution is due to “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opi-
nion . . . .” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
(2000). 
 248. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003). 
 249. Id. at 1234. 
 250. Id. (“Defendant received 365 days of jail credit and 74 days of gap time 
credit. Thus, at his sentencing on June 23, 2000, defendant’s final date for his 
eighteen-month sentence was September 1, 2000.”). 
 251. Id. at 1234–35. See also New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (1999). 
 252. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1234–35 (noting that Bellamy had previously 
been convicted of one other sexual offense and that another was reduced and 
later dismissed). 
 253. See id. at 1238. 
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In State v. Bellamy, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that there is a duty to warn about a possible civil commitment 
under the state’s SVPA because of the severity of its conse-
quences.254 The decision recognized that commitment “is theo-
retically without end. In that sense, it constitutes a greater li-
berty deprivation than that imposed upon a criminal defendant 
who, in all but a handful of cases, is given a maximum release 
date. A more onerous impairment of a person’s liberty interest 
is difficult to imagine.”255 The court “continue[d] to stress the 
necessity of determining whether a consequence is direct or 
penal when analyzing whether a defendant must be informed of 
a particular consequence.”256 However, it then made a signifi-
cant departure from this analysis and held that “when the con-
sequence of a plea may be so severe that a defendant may be 
confined for the remainder of his or her life, fundamental fair-
ness demands that the trial court inform defendant of that 
possible consequence.”257 
The Bellamy court’s approach evidenced a critical move 
away from the formalistic distinction between “collateral” and 
“direct” consequences.258 Although based on state constitutional 
grounds,259 and thus of limited precedential effect, the Bellamy 
decision is significant in its recognition that lack of knowledge 
about serious consequences undermines the basic fairness and 
legitimacy of a guilty plea. It is difficult to maintain that a plea 
without such knowledge is truly a voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent act. 
In a recent decision interpreting its state constitutional 
right to a jury trial, the Arizona Supreme Court also considered 
the severity of a “collateral” consequence as the controlling fac-
tor.260 The state charged Dale Joseph Fushek with various mis-
demeanors and also sought a trial court ruling mandating life-
time sex offender registration on the grounds that the charges 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. (quoting In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 173 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. (“[I]t matters little if the consequences are called indirect or colla-
teral when in fact their impact is devastating.” (quoting State v. Heitzman, 
527 A.2d 439, 441 (N.J. 1987) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting))). 
 259. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion.”). 
 260. Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008). 
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were “sexually motivated” even though they were not otherwise 
qualifying crimes for the registry.261 Construing the Arizona 
Constitution as consistent with the federal constitutional guar-
antee of a jury trial only for “serious”—as opposed to “petty”—
crimes, the court first found that, given their relatively low po-
tential jail sentences, the crimes charged were “presumptively 
not jury-trial eligible.”262 Next, the court noted the United 
States Supreme Court’s view that “seriousness” is reflected in 
the legislature’s decisions about the nonpenal as well as penal 
consequences of the crime.263 Under that authority, the court 
considered whether sex offender registration moved Fushek’s 
case into the category of jury eligibility.264  
The court clarified that the issue was not whether registra-
tion constituted criminal punishment for ex post facto purpos-
es, which the court had decided in the negative in an earlier de-
cision,265 “but rather whether it is a statutory consequence 
reflecting a legislative determination that Fushek’s alleged of-
fenses are ‘serious.’”266 Because the test determining if a sanc-
tion is criminal or civil “does not measure whether a sanction is 
sufficiently severe to trigger the right to jury trial under the 
Sixth Amendment,” the court undertook an independent in-
quiry into severity.267 It found that “sex offender registration is 
a lifelong obligation,” with stringent requirements governing 
obligations to provide notice to the authorities about place of 
residence, work and education, “widespread publicity” in the 
community about those on the register, and felony criminal pe-
nalties for those who fail to comply. The court “conclude[d] that 
 
 261. Id. at 538; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-118(A) (2001) (“In each 
criminal case involving an offense other than a sexual offense, the prosecutor 
may file a special allegation of sexual motivation if sufficient admissible evi-
dence exists that would justify a finding of sexual motivation by a reasonable 
and objective finder of fact.”); id. § 13-3821(C) (“[T]he judge who sentences a 
defendant . . . for an offense for which there was a finding of sexual motivation 
pursuant to § 13-118 may require the person who committed the offense to 
register [as a sex offender].”) (emphasis added). 
 262. Fushek, 183 P.3d at 539–40. 
 263. Id. at 540 (citing Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 
(1989)). 
 264. See id. at 538. 
 265. Id. at 541 (citing State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992)). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. at 542 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168–69 (1963)). The relevant question was whether the legislatively enacted 
consequence of registration as a sex offender, together with the codified penal 
sanction, indicated a legislative determination that the crimes charged were 
“serious.” Id. at 541–43. 
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the potential of sex offender registration reflects a legislative 
determination that Fushek has been charged with serious 
crimes” and thus conferred upon him the right to a jury trial.268 
In these two examples, as well as in other settings,269 
courts have taken the severity of a collateral consequence into 
account in fashioning constitutional procedural rules. Bellamy 
and Fushek, either explicitly or implicitly, both recognize that 
the “direct” penal sanction is not the end of the matter for a de-
fendant facing criminal charges. “Collateral” sanctions can 
loom large and indeed can completely overshadow the criminal 
penalties. Severity of consequence is a critical factor in a prin-
cipled rule of the right to information in the plea process. 
2. Likelihood That a Consequence Will Apply 
This factor should be judged along the spectrum of the 
chance that the particular consequence would apply to the de-
fendant should he be convicted of the underlying crime. It thus 
considers the process by which the consequence would apply. 
When the fact of the underlying conviction serves as the sole 
and nondiscretionary predicate for imposition of the conse-
quence, there is no way for the defendant to rebut the convic-
tion; it is there, and the collateral consequence flows as a mat-
ter of law or regulation. Other consequences are less likely to 
apply, often because they are discretionary or require a proce-
dure separate and apart from the criminal proceeding. 
This factor would come into play when a consequence is 
close but perhaps not quite at the level of severity that would 
significantly affect a plea decision. Here, a high likelihood of 
application, combined with an increased level of “severity,” 
would mandate warnings as a matter of due process. 
The “likelihood” factor of the reasonableness proposal has 
some similarities, at least semantically, to the Fourth Circuit’s 
“definite, immediate and largely automatic” Cuthrell test.270 
The underlying concern of the Fourth Circuit’s approach, 
though, was action, or lack thereof, by the sentencing judge. 
 
 268. Id. Fushek’s jury trial was set for October 27, 2008. Jim Walsh, Sus-
pended Priest’s Trial Set for October, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 13, 2008, at B1. 
 269. Although not directly implicating constitutional rules of criminal pro-
cedure, “[t]he severity of sex offender commitment causes those selected for 
such confinement to be granted protections tantamount to those in the crimi-
nal process. This differs from many other collateral sanctions, which are im-
posed automatically upon the conviction of a specific type of offense.” Dem-
leitner, supra note 29, at 1638. 
 270. See supra Part I.B.1.b.i for a critique of the Cuthrell test. 
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The Cuthrell test reflects the desire to safeguard the values of 
efficiency and finality in the plea bargaining process. The key 
to the likelihood-of-application consideration, by contrast, is 
how the defendant experiences the consequence, regardless of 
which body imposes the consequence. 
When a consequence of a conviction flows directly from the 
fact of that conviction, the defendant has no opportunity to con-
test its application. From his perspective, then, it is as much a 
part of the punishment as any penal sanction he received. In 
agreeing to plead guilty when there is no mention of such a 
likely consequence, a person does not get the benefit he thought 
he bargained for; the plea, in short, does not meet his reasona-
ble expectations. 
In addition, from the standpoint of administrative incon-
venience, there is no good argument against warnings about 
such likely consequences. A limited number of nonpenal conse-
quences flow directly from the fact of the conviction, and it is 
not onerous for judges and defense lawyers to learn these and 
inform their clients and defendants who plead guilty in their 
courts.271 While it is the severity factor which accomplishes, 
most directly, the goal of injecting a defendant’s perspective in-
to the right to preplea information, the likelihood of application 
operates as an important second level of protection that broa-
dens the scope of what qualifies for warnings as a matter of due 
process. 
Sex Offender Registration Acts (SORAs) illustrate a conse-
quence that is high on the likelihood spectrum. Under most 
SORAs, individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses must 
register with local authorities. For example, a person convicted 
of misdemeanor sexual misconduct under New York’s penal law 
is subject to the state’s SORA.272 Neither the judge nor the 
Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders may waive this require-
ment; the duty to register flows automatically from the fact of 
conviction.273 As the Texas high court has noted in considering 
that state’s SORA, “the consequence, registration as a sex of-
fender, is definite. It is also completely automatic; if a defen-
 
 271. See infra notes 340–346 and accompanying text (discussing how coun-
sel and judges might handle the additional task of limited warnings); see also 
supra note 32 and accompanying text (pointing out that courts already have a 
statutory duty to warn about immigration consequences in some states). 
 272. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2007); see also N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 2004) (defining the misdemeanor of “sexual 
misconduct”). 
 273. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-d(1)(a) (McKinney 2007). 
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dant pleads to an enumerated offense, he must register; there 
are no exceptions, no wiggle room, no conditions which relieve 
him of that obligation.”274 The penal sanction for the low-level 
misdemeanor conviction, which may be as minimal as the night 
already served in jail, is completely overshadowed by the pros-
pect of automatic SORA registration, which is often lifelong and 
often with community-notification requirements. 
Another example of a highly likely consequence is deporta-
tion of a person convicted of an “aggravated felony” under fed-
eral immigration law.275 Amendments to federal immigration 
law in 1996 retroactively “amplifie[d] the previous definition [of 
aggravated felony] to encompass offenses that are properly nei-
ther felonies nor ‘aggravated.’”276 Since that time, individuals 
convicted even of such minor crimes as shoplifting or subway 
turnstile jumping can (and indeed have, in documented cases) 
become “aggravated felons.”277 Almost all aggravated felony 
convictions lead to automatic deportation; neither an immigra-
tion court nor even the Attorney General has the discretion to 
waive this consequence.278 Although immigration officials do 
not find and deport every person convicted of an “aggravated 
felony,” the likelihood-of-application factor does not ask wheth-
er the consequence will actually be executed, but rather wheth-
er it applies. The fact that someone may, by chance, escape de-
portation does not make this consequence any less “likely.” 
 
 274. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). But see 
id. at 136 (holding that failure to warn does not violate due process or render a 
plea involuntary, since the sex offender registration requirement is a nonpuni-
tive, though direct, measure). 
 275. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is convicted of 
an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”); id. 
§ 1101(a)(43) (describing the numerous offenses categorized as “aggravated 
felonies”). 
 276. Marley, supra note 28, at 859. 
 277. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, When a MetroCard Led Far Out of Town, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004 at B1 (reporting on a permanent legal resident from 
Madagascar who faced deportation for the “‘crimes involving moral turpi-
tude’ . . . [of ] three convictions for MetroCard offenses”); Patrick J. McDonnell, 
Criminal Past Comes Back to Haunt Some Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
1997, at A1 (describing deportation proceedings to send a twenty-year U.S. 
resident back to Nigeria based on her two shoplifting convictions). 
 278. Marley, supra note 28, at 874 (“[A] lawful permanent resident who 
falls within the 1996 definition of aggravated felon . . . . [r]egardless of the pet-
tiness of his crime, regardless of how unfair it may be to exile him from his 
adopted country and his family, and regardless of the punishment, including 
death, he may receive at his country of origin . . . is no longer eligible for dis-
cretionary relief . . . .”). But see supra note 224 (noting very limited class of 
cases where discretionary relief from deportation is still available). 
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On the other end of the likelihood spectrum are such 
things as difficulty finding work when saddled with a criminal 
record, at least for those jobs that do not deny a professional li-
cense or clearance based on convictions.279 For example, a per-
son convicted of a drug felony might seek employment in a non-
regulated area such as general business office work or 
construction. Even if there is no law or regulation barring 
people convicted of drug felonies from working in such jobs, 
many employers now ask applicants to submit to a criminal 
background check.280 The best practice, particularly given the 
fact that such background requests are increasingly common in 
both employment and housing, is to warn the individual facing 
a plea decision even if not under a constitutional obligation to 
do so. Alternatively, even if such warnings were not mandated 
under the “likelihood of application” factor, they might be un-
der the more heavily weighted severity inquiry. 
B. THE RULE OF REASONABLENESS APPLIED TO SVPAS 
Involuntary commitment under an SVPA is a clear-cut 
case in which due process would require a preplea warning un-
der this Article’s proposed reasonableness test. Due to its high-
ly severe nature, any reasonable defendant would place signifi-
cant weight on the possibility of lifelong involuntary 
commitment as a sexually violent predator in the decision-
making process leading up to a guilty plea. Not every defendant 
will ultimately decide, due to the potential for commitment, to 
reject all plea offers. However, this is information that reason-
able defendants will rely upon in making knowledgeable, vo-
luntary decisions about whether to plead guilty to a qualifying 
offense in the states with SVPAs.281 
Although the severity of involuntary commitment makes it 
an obvious candidate for warnings, it is not a consequence 
 
 279. Joseph P. Fried, When ‘Help Wanted’ Comes with a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2006, § 10, at 1. 
 280. Cf. Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell 
Tales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (discussing increased use of back-
ground checks among employers and the inaccuracy of criminal records pro-
vided to them by for-profit database companies). 
 281. Although the same would hold true in states with pending involuntary 
commitment legislation, the right to information about consequences which do 
not yet exist at the time of the plea further complicates the constitutional equ-
ation. This situation is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that at 
the very least, a defendant might have a colorable claim for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel if his lawyer failed to inform him that he was pleading guilty 
to a qualifying offense in a state with an SVPA under consideration.  
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which is high on the likelihood scale. Under the Kansas SVPA, 
which is the model for most states’ legislation, the commitment 
process includes an initial probable cause determination, fol-
lowed by confinement if cause exists.282 At trial, the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a “sexually 
violent predator.”283 The individual on trial has a right to coun-
sel, to a mental health examination, to present and cross ex-
amine witnesses, to some discovery, and (if either the individu-
al, the prosecutor, or the judge demands it) to a jury trial.284 
Finally, the individual has a right to yearly reviews of the indi-
vidual’s mental condition to determine if continued confine-
ment is justified or if the individual is ready to move to the next 
level of treatment.285 
This process, which is completely separate from the crimi-
nal proceeding that sets the SVPA wheels in motion,286 is the 
 
 282. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05 (2005). 
 283. Id. § 59-29a07(a) (2005). This high standard of proof is not the case in 
the federal system, where the standard is “clear and convincing evidence.” See 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
§ 301, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at, but later omitted from, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)). 
But see United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Minn. 2008) (holding 18 
U.S.C. § 4248(d) unconstitutional). Also, as one source noted, only half of the 
states with SVPAs similar to the federal law use the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard. See Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 26, at 5. 
 284. § 59-29a06. 
 285. § 59-29a08. 
 286. Although a criminal conviction is certainly an integral part of most 
commitment proceedings, some SVPAs do not require an actual conviction as a 
predicate for commitment. Instead, they might also define “sexually violent 
predator” to include individuals who were merely charged with a qualifying 
crime. See, e.g., id. § 59-29a02(a). The intent here appears to be inclusion of 
individuals who were charged yet found not guilty by reason of insanity, who 
were acquitted because the defendant “offered substantial evidence of a men-
tal disease or defect excluding the mental state required as an element of the 
offense charged” under section 22-3221 of the Kansas Statutes, or who were 
found incompetent to stand trial. See id. § 59-29a03; see also id.  § 22-3221 
(2007). Nevertheless, anecdotal review of the cases and news articles reveals 
SVPA commitments only of individuals convicted of sex offenses, and often 
convicted of multiple sex offenses on different occasions. Cf. Kansas v. Crane, 
534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (describing Crane as “a previously convicted sexual 
offender”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (describing Hen-
dricks as “an inmate who had a long history of sexually molesting children”); 
Davey & Goodnough, supra note 161 (describing various committed offenders); 
Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, For Sex Offenders, a Dispute on Therapy’s 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A1; Goodnough & Davey, supra note 
165. Although this limited review only considered reported decisions and cases 
described in the press, it seems fair to say that actual conviction has been a 
central element of most if not all commitments under SVPAs. In terms of invo-
luntary commitment under the federal SVPA, “everyone facing [an SVPA] cer-
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reason that involuntary commitment ranks relatively low on 
the likelihood of application spectrum. Indeed, courts have fo-
cused on the SVPA process to justify labeling it “collateral.”287 
Certainly, the fact that there is a separate process is relevant 
to a defendant, and it may mean that he will decide to plead 
guilty and then take advantage of that process, if need be, to 
argue that commitment is not appropriate. Yet relying solely on 
the independence of this process from the sentencing proceed-
ing and on the uncertainty of its outcome ignores its severity. 
Due to the extremely harsh nature of involuntary commitment, 
any reasonable defendant would consider it a significant factor 
in the plea decision-making process, even though it is not au-
tomatically imposed upon conviction, and the state may never 
in fact seek or secure commitment. 
Relying on the separate process to excuse advisement also 
ignores the real potential for a defendant’s postplea surprise 
about the possibility of such a severe, additional consequence. 
While one might argue that a person convicted of forcible rape 
is on fair notice that involuntary commitment under an exist-
ing SVPA is possible or even likely, it is hard to make that ar-
gument for the many crimes that meet the definition of a “sex-
ually violent crime” under some SVPAs. In South Carolina, for 
example, the long list of qualifying crimes includes such of-
fenses as employing “a person under the age of eighteen years 
to appear in a state of sexually explicit nudity . . . in a public 
place,” where mistake of age is not a defense to a prosecu-
tion.288 It also includes a number of obscenity crimes involving 
minors, including possession of obscene materials, some of 
which are also strict liability crimes.289 South Carolina also in-
 
tification does have at least one sex-related conviction . . . .” Baron-Evans & 
Noonan, supra note 26, at 3. 
 287. See supra Part II.B (discussing how most courts have found no duty to 
warn about an SVPA). 
 288. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(l) (Supp. 2007) (defining sexually 
violent offenses as “violations of Article 3, Chapter 15 of Title 16 involving a 
minor when the violations are felonies”); see also id. § 16-15-387 (2003 & Supp. 
2007) (locating the crime of employing a minor to appear in public in a state of 
sexually explicit nudity within Article 3, Chapter 15 of Title 16, and defining 
the substantive crime). Under the criminal statute, “sexually explicit nudity” 
is defined as: “(a) uncovered, or less than opaquely covered human genitals, 
pubic area, or buttocks, or the nipple or any portion of the areola of the human 
female breast; or (b) covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid 
state.” Id. § 16-15-375(6) (2003).  
 289. See id. § 44-48-30(2)(l) (Supp. 2007). 
 2008] MYTH OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 729 
 
cludes sodomy on its SVPA list,290 although that triggering 
crime is certainly unconstitutional in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.291 As one expert noted, 
“[a]lthough atypical, qualifying offenses can include sexual be-
havior in which the offender does not physically touch the vic-
tim (e.g., voyeurism or exhibitionism) and does not ‘stalk’ or 
‘groom’ their victim as the term predator would imply.”292 
Three situations specific to involuntary commitment high-
light why lack of knowledge about an SVPA can lead to pleas 
that are not knowing and voluntary, and why it is so critical to 
take the defendant’s perspective into account in determining 
requisite knowledge. Two involve types of pleas, namely “no 
contest” and Alford pleas, which result in convictions without 
any admission of guilt or with a protestation of innocence, re-
spectively. The third situation is the fact that under some 
SVPAs even nonsexual offenses can be qualifying convictions 
for the purpose of involuntary commitment. All three situa-
tions, because they can so easily lead a reasonable person to as-
sume that the SVPA would not apply to them, illustrate and 
emphasize the need for transparency in the plea-bargain 
process.293 
1. “No Contest” and Alford Pleas 
A plea of nolo contendere, or “no contest,” is “a plea by 
which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but none-
theless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for 
 
 290. Id. § 44-48-30(2)(j) (listing the crime of “buggery” in SVPA); see also id. 
§ 16-15-120 (2003 & Supp. 2007) (making “buggery” a felony with a mandatory 
sentence of five years in prison, a fine of $500, or both).  
 291. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute outlawing consen-
sual sexual contact between persons of the same gender violates due process); 
see also id. at 574–75 (declining to rule on petitioners’ alternative argument 
“that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause” because under such a ruling “some might ques-
tion whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit 
the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants” (citing Ro-
mer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996))). While “buggery” has been in the South 
Carolina criminal code since 1712, 2 THOMAS COOPER, STATUTES OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 465, 493 (1837), the state legislature enacted the SVPA which lists 
buggery as a qualifying crime in 1998. See 1998 S.C. Acts No. A321 (codified 
as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (Supp. 2007)). 
 292. Deming, supra note 23, at 7. 
 293. The case for warnings also applies to the more typical situation, 
where, for example, a person enters a regular guilty plea and accepts a sen-
tence of five years in prison without any knowledge that these five years may 
turn into a lifelong involuntary confinement. 
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purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.”294 During 
such pleas a defendant is agreeing to refrain from contesting, 
rather than affirmatively voicing his guilt to, the charge or 
charges. 
A defendant enters an Alford plea when he pleads guilty 
despite asserting his innocence. In North Carolina v. Alford, 
the trial court had heard evidence from various prosecution 
witnesses before accepting Alford’s plea.295 Alford then stated: 
I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is 
too much evidence, but I ain’t shot no man, but I take the fault for the 
other man. We never had an argument in our life and I just pleaded 
guilty because they said if I didn’t they would gas me for it, and that 
is all.296 
The Supreme Court found such pleas to be constitutionally 
permissible, so long as the trial court determined a strong fac-
tual basis for the underlying offense.297 
The basic premise behind both nolo contendere and Alford 
pleas is that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, 
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a 
prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime.”298 Such pleas 
have the same force and effect as a guilty plea for the purpose 
of giving the defendant a conviction and allowing a judge to im-
pose a sentence. Most state criminal procedure codes allow Al-
ford pleas,299 and nolo contendere pleas are permitted with the 
court’s (and sometimes also the prosecution’s) consent.300 
These pleas can lead to any number of collateral conse-
quences, including involuntary commitment under an SVPA. 
For example, Florida’s SVPA specifically includes nolo conten-
dere pleas in its definition of “convicted of a sexually violent of-
fense.”301 In other states, the SVPA might broadly refer to a 
“conviction” for a qualifying offense more generally, which 
 
 294. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970). 
 295. Id. at 28. 
 296. Id. at 29 n.2. 
 297. Id. at 37. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
381 (2d ed. 2005) (“[A] substantial majority of states follow the lead of the U.S. 
Supreme Court [in North Carolina v. Alford] and allow a defendant to plead 
guilty, despite claims of innocence, so long as the prosecution establishes a 
strong factual basis to support the conviction. Fewer than a half-dozen states 
prevent trial judges from accepting Alford pleas.”). 
 300. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 62, § 21.4(a), at 1006. 
 301. See FLA. STAT. § 394.912(2)(c) (1999). 
 2008] MYTH OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 731 
 
would include the conviction that results from any nolo conten-
dere or Alford plea. 
The problems resulting from the current lack of a duty to 
warn defendants about collateral consequences, most promi-
nently the failure to account for the defendant’s perspective in 
the guilty plea process, are exacerbated in the context of nolo 
contendere and Alford pleas. For example, Jimmie Dale Otto 
pleaded no contest to felony child molestation.302 Although Otto 
did not make detailed admissions to the charged conduct dur-
ing his plea, the trial court found the requisite factual basis for 
his conviction in the police report detailing the incidents.303 The 
court later sentenced Otto to twelve years in prison.304 Prior to 
his release on parole, the state sought to commit Otto under 
California’s SVPA. During the ensuing SVPA proceeding, the 
State relied on the complaining witnesses’ hearsay statements 
in the police report to help meet its burden of proving that Otto 
was a “sexually violent predator” as defined in the Act.305 
The California Supreme Court rejected Otto’s argument 
“that because he pleaded no contest . . . he had little motivation 
to challenge the accuracy of the victims’ statements at the time 
of sentencing for the underlying crimes.”306 In holding that the 
complaining witnesses’ statements were admissible and that 
reliance on them did not violate Otto’s right to due process in 
the SVPA proceeding,307 the Court emphasized that the fact of 
Otto’s no contest plea “admitted the truth of the victims’ state-
ments.”308 Otto’s involuntary commitment, for an initial period 
of two years and indefinitely renewable under the statute, thus 
stood.309 
In George v. Black, the defendant challenged the volunta-
riness of his guilty plea on the grounds that the trial judge 
failed to inform him that he could be civilly committed under a 
state mental health proceeding, based on his sex offense convic-
tion.310 Joseph George Jr. originally pleaded not guilty and 
 
 302. People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Cal. 2001). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id.  
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 1069. 
 307. Id. at 1066–70. 
 308. Id. at 1068. 
 309. Id. at 1063–64; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2008) 
(mandating indeterminate term of confinement if individual is found to be a 
“sexually violent predator”). 
 310. 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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went to trial on sexual assault charges. Only after an appellate 
court reversed his conviction did he plead nolo contendere to 
lower charges.311 Despite these facts, the Eighth Circuit found 
that commitment was collateral and thus no warnings were re-
quired.312 
A case from the D.C. Circuit provides a more appropriate 
understanding of the defendant’s calculus in making an Alford 
plea. The court examined the claim that it was abuse of discre-
tion to deny a defendant the right, under the Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure that allows postsentence plea withdrawal 
upon a showing of “manifest injustice,” to withdraw his Alford 
plea when he was unaware that the conviction would lead to 
deportation.313 The court stated: 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Alford, there are situations in 
which a defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling 
or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. 
When such a defendant learns that his plea will have additional con-
sequences of an unquestionably serious nature, and rapidly changes 
his calculations about the costs and benefits of standing trial, it may 
be manifestly unjust to hold the defendant to his earlier bargain un-
less the district court identifies offsetting elements of the administra-
tion of justice.314 
These cases all highlight the reasonable expectations of a 
person entering a nolo contendere or Alford plea. Such pleas 
presumably arise when the prosecution or court has tried, un-
successfully, to secure a guilty plea with an admission. The re-
sult is a compromise, one that allows a defendant to avoid a de-
tailed admission of guilt to the underlying facts of the crime 
charged. When a defendant enters such a plea, he is likely to 
assume that collateral consequences would not flow from the 
conviction, since the court (and perhaps also the prosecution) 
have agreed that he does not have to say that he committed the 
crime but instead only state that he is pleading guilty. This 
 
 311. See id. at 109. 
 312. Id. at 111. A number of courts have found an Alford plea valid despite 
failure to warn about an SVPA. See, e.g., In re Gibson, 168 S.W.3d 72, 73–75 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that sexually violent predator proceedings follow-
ing defendant’s Alford plea did not violate agreement which allowed plea yet 
did not mention SVPA proceedings); Ames v. Johnson, No. CL04-413, 2005 WL 
820305, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005) (rejecting Ames’s attempt to with-
draw his plea of nolo contendere on the grounds that his lawyer was ineffec-
tive for failing to warn him about Virginia’s SVPA). 
 313. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39–40 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (analyz-
ing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)). 
 314. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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same analysis holds true—and is perhaps even more apt—
when a defendant enters an Alford plea and protests his inno-
cence. 
With these types of pleas, knowledge of a certain or severe 
collateral consequence may well have caused the scales to tip 
away from a defendant’s willingness or desire to accept a con-
viction. In other words, a reasonable defendant in such a situa-
tion is even more likely than a reasonable defendant entering a 
standard guilty plea to make the collateral consequence a sig-
nificant factor in the plea decision-making process. The result 
is that nolo contendere and Alford pleas taken without know-
ledge of certain collateral consequences are even less likely to 
be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of the relevant 
constitutional rights. These examples underscore the need to 
impose a duty to inform. 
2. Nonsexual Offenses 
Six of the twenty SVPA states either explicitly include 
nonsexual offenses in their list of qualifying convictions or de-
fine “sexually violent predator” broadly enough to include non-
sexual offenses.315 For example, under the Kansas SVPA the 
prosecutor is required to file a “special allegation of sexual mo-
tivation” in “every criminal case other than sex offenses” where 
there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding of sexual motiva-
tion.316 The court with jurisdiction over the criminal case must 
then make a finding of whether sexual motivation was present 
or, if there is a jury trial, the jury must make that determina-
tion through a special verdict on the issue.317 Under the federal 
SVPA, inmates in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody are statuto-
rily subject to the legislation even if they are not in “custody for 
anything to do with a sex crime and need not have ever been 
convicted of a sex crime.”318 These provisions cast a very broad 
net, and could include such situations as a person pleading 
guilty to burglarizing an ex-girlfriend’s apartment. In the case 
of the federal statute, if a person in federal custody “has any-
thing in his past that suggests prior sexual misconduct, if he 
 
 315. See FL. STAT. § 394.912 (h) (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(10)(g) 
(2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a14(a) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02.7a(b) 
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) 
(Supp. 2007). 
 316. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a14(a) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 317. Id. § 59-29a14(b). 
 318. See Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 26, at 3. 
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admits to prior misconduct or deviant desires or fantasies in 
‘treatment,’ or if he is likely to fabricate sexual deviance for 
amusement, attention or to please his interrogators in ‘treat-
ment,’ he is in jeopardy.”319 
Currently, there is no evidence of a widespread use of such 
broad, catch-all provisions. For example, under the federal 
SVPA “everyone currently facing a certification does have at 
least one sex-related conviction.”320 Cases reported in the media 
involving SVPA commitments, certainly, have detailed one or 
more often truly violent sexual offense convictions.321 However, 
as one commentator noted with respect to the federal BOP but 
equally applicable to state authorities, “while BOP may have 
exhibited some restraint in the initial round of ‘test case’ certi-
fications, it may not continue to do so going forward.”322 Indeed, 
the potential for expansion to the full reach of any statute regu-
lating sex offenses has been demonstrated in the sex offender 
registry context. The state of Arizona, for example, sought 
mandatory registration for a person charged only with misde-
meanors that were not explicitly listed in the registration law; 
instead, the state used the catch-all provision allowing for reg-
istration for nonsexual offenses that the criminal trial court 
found to be “sexually motivated.”323 
The point, however, is not the current state of SVPA con-
finements, or the lack thereof, for nonsexual offenses. It is that, 
to any reasonable defendant considering a guilty plea to a non-
sexual but potentially “sexually motivated” offense, the possi-
bility of lifelong involuntary commitment as a sexual predator 
would be a significant factor in deciding whether to proceed 
with the plea. In this respect, the duty to warn becomes critical 
to protecting the central norms of due process in the guilty plea 
context. In addition, due to “special allegation”-type proceed-
ings during the criminal case for nonsexual offenses in states 
 
 319. Id. at 17; see also id. at 3 (noting how the Bureau of Prisons “recently 
confirmed that it will consider all ‘evidence’ of sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation from any source, ‘whether or not a conviction resulted, and 
whether or not the person’s present custody is based on the conduct in ques-
tion’”) (quoting 72 Fed. Reg. 43,207 (July 13, 2007)). 
 320. Id. at 3. 
 321. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (“[A]necdotal review of the 
cases and news articles reveals SVPA commitments only of individuals con-
victed of sex offenses, and often convicted of multiple sex offenses on different 
occasions.”). 
 322. See Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 26, at 11. 
 323. See supra notes 260–264 and accompanying text (discussing Fushek v. 
State). 
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like Kansas, the roles of the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense 
counsel at that juncture are integral to the later SVPA 
process.324 Because of their full, preconviction awareness of the 
possibility that the SVPA may apply in such cases, an argu-
ment that a duty to warn would slow down the process or 
somehow overwhelm overburdened actors in the criminal jus-
tice system should not excuse a duty to warn. 
C. EFFICIENCY AND FINALITY VS. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO INFORMATION 
The collateral-consequences rule, which allows and sanc-
tions defendant ignorance, is singularly concerned with the ef-
fect of a right to knowledge of collateral consequences on the 
criminal justice system, and is myopic about its effect on the 
defendant. It is protective only of such institutional values as 
finality and efficiency in the administration of criminal justice, 
built upon a system of high levels of guilty pleas. This under-
mines the constitutional protections surrounding guilty pleas, 
with their underlying purpose of ensuring that defendants 
know what they are getting themselves into when they plead 
guilty. A reasonableness standard, by contrast, furthers that 
important purpose. 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he State to some de-
gree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in the 
criminal process.”325 Indeed, guilty pleas in the past several 
decades have risen even from their previously high levels, now 
constituting upwards of ninety-nine percent of convictions in 
some jurisdictions.326 The courts, and many commentators, 
have opined that the criminal justice system would grind to a 
halt, or even crumble, without plea bargaining.327 
 
 324. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) (Supp. 2006) (defining “sex-
ually violent offense” to include “any offense for which the [criminal trial] 
judge makes a specific finding on the record that based on the circumstances of 
the case, the person’s offense should be considered a sexually violent offense” 
(emphasis added)). 
 325. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). 
 326. See supra notes 59, 149 and accompanying text (discussing guilty plea 
statistics). 
 327. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“Disposi-
tion of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the 
process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.”); MILTON HEUMANN, 
PLEA BARGAINING 32 (1978) (“[P]lea bargaining is integrally and inextricably 
bound to the ‘trial’ court.”). 
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Whether or not that is true,328 one court’s statement would 
draw little disagreement: “The chief virtues of plea agreements 
are speed, economy, and finality.”329 Or, as the Supreme Court 
put it, “[w]hatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the 
fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bar-
gain are important components of this country’s criminal jus-
tice system,” and the advantages of guilty pleas can only be se-
cured if they “are accorded a great measure of finality.”330 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has shown its “willing-
ness to sacrifice important [constitutional] principles at the al-
tar of . . . efficiency and finality.”331 Driven by this “fundamen-
tal interest in the finality of guilty pleas,”332 the collateral-
consequences rule is fiercely protective of pleas, once they have 
been entered. It strictly limits the quantum of preplea informa-
tion that must flow to a defendant in order to avoid what courts 
perceive as a strong, multifaceted threat to the criminal justice 
system: 
Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the 
integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial 
work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of jus-
tice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside guilty 
pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions 
result from such pleas.333 
Finality may be a legitimate policy concern, but it is not as 
fragile a concept as is so often put forth. As Professor Gabriel J. 
Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr. noted, in arguing that requir-
ing lawyers to warn clients about certain collateral conse-
quences would not open the floodgates to postconviction chal-
 
 328. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1037, 1037 (1984) (“[E]ffective containment of plea bargaining is realisti-
cally possible for American criminal courts.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). 
 329. United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 330. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
 331. Roger Fairfax, Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional 
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2030 (2008) (critiquing the 
Court’s failure to include jury trial rights in the exception to harmless error 
law for “structural” problems). 
 332. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see also United States v. 
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 670 (1997) (noting how a permissive plea withdrawal in-
terpretation would “debase[ ] the judicial proceeding at which a defendant 
pleads and the court accepts his plea by allowing him to withdraw his plea 
simply on a lark”). 
 333. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting United 
States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)). 
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lenges, it would be “an unusual case that would satisfy the[] 
stringent requirements” for proving ineffective assistance of 
counsel.334 
This observation applies equally in the due process context. 
In the first instance, a more rigorous rule of reasonableness 
would ensure better front-end warnings, leading to knowing 
pleas and thus avoiding postconviction attacks on those pleas. 
Even when the reasonableness standard requires withdrawal of 
a guilty plea, dismissal of the case does not follow. Instead, the 
court would reinstate the original charges.335 While there is a 
concern that some defendants will move to withdraw pleas, 
based on violation of the reasonableness rule, solely to seek a 
better offer when the case is somewhat older (and thus more 
challenging and risky for prosecutors to bring to trial), such 
gaming is impossible to predict and should not outweigh the 
rights of other defendants to enforcement of their constitutional 
protections. Most defendants who pleaded guilty based on their 
determination that the plea was the preferable option would 
seek to withdraw that plea only if the fact of the collateral con-
sequence tipped the scale away from that earlier decision.336 
The scales would tip only if the collateral consequence really 
mattered, which is exactly the type of consequence that a de-
fendant should know about before pleading guilty. 
Courts are institutionally competent to administer a rea-
sonableness approach to preplea warnings. In a statement that 
epitomizes the judiciary’s often hostile attitude towards the 
idea of more court involvement with a defendant’s right to in-
formation, one court insisted that judges cannot be expected to 
 
 334. Chin & Holmes, supra note 68, at 739. Under the two-prong test for 
establishing ineffective assistance, see supra notes 110–111 and accompanying 
text (describing Strickland), a defendant would have to show that a conse-
quence is well-established, so that the failure to warn would be incompetent 
lawyering. In addition, in order to establish prejudice, a defendant would have 
to show that the collateral consequence was serious as compared to the direct 
consequence, so that “knowledge of the collateral consequences might have 
made a difference.” Chin & Holmes, supra note 68, at 739–40. 
 335. See, e.g., State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1239 (N.J. 2003) (noting, 
after holding that Bellamy was entitled as a matter of fundamental fairness to 
be warned about the state SVPA, that the proper remedy “[i]f the trial court is 
satisfied that defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea,” was 
plea withdrawal and reinstatement of the original charges). 
 336. As criminal defense trial and appellate practitioners know, many de-
fendants seek to withdraw their pleas, for a variety of reasons, once they have 
been sentenced. A reasonableness rule, which would allow meritorious claims 
in those small percentage of cases where they arose, is not likely to open the 
withdrawal gates further in any significant way. 
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“anticipate the multifarious peripheral contingencies which 
may affect the defendant’’s civil liabilities, his eligibility for a 
variety of societal benefits, his civil rights or his right to remain 
in this country.”337 The same decision did go on, after denying 
the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to the 
trial judge’s failure to inform him about deportation conse-
quences, to suggest that defense counsel was best positioned to 
provide such information.338 While this observation about de-
fense counsel may be true, courts have almost uniformly re-
jected a right to information about collateral consequences as a 
matter of effective assistance of counsel.339 In addition, al-
though many courts handle high numbers of criminal cases, the 
unfortunate reality should not drive the constitutional norm. 
Requiring judges to ensure that a defendant knows about 
any consequence that is either highly likely to apply or so se-
vere that it would be a significant factor in the plea decision-
making process is unlikely to incapacitate courts from adminis-
tering criminal justice. The number of highly likely conse-
quences is limited and judges presiding over criminal cases 
should be aware of them. As for severity, in some cases judges 
could quite easily add the requisite warning. For example, 
many states now require immigration consequences warnings 
under state statute or court rule.340 In other, more nuanced, 
cases, courts could fulfill their due process duty by inquiring 
whether defense counsel had fulfilled their effective assistance 
duty.341 
The experience in New Jersey belies the claim that courts 
cannot handle additional warnings. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s recent holding that its state constitution requires SVPA 
warnings342 resulted in the creation of new plea forms that dis-
close the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent 
 
 337. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 338. Id. (analyzing defendant’s claim as a violation of rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and not as a matter of constitutional law). 
 339. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 340. See supra note 32. 
 341. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-1.4(c) (3d ed. 1999) (setting forth standards under which 
the judge would advise a defendant directly about certain collateral conse-
quences and would suggest that defendant “consult with defense counsel if the 
defendant needs additional information concerning the potential consequences 
of the plea”). 
 342. See supra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (discussing Bellamy). 
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predator.343 The New Jersey courts had already required de-
fendants to fill out plea forms which advised them of various 
consequences of their pleas, including the potential penal sen-
tences, any mandatory parole disqualifiers, and any potential 
fines or penalties. The defendant fills out those plea forms in 
consultation with his attorney, and the prosecutor then signs 
them. As one New Jersey practitioner noted, “[t]hose plea forms 
have been continually expanded over the years so that now in 
sexual assault cases the defendant is also advised of the Me-
gan’s Law consequences (lifetime reporting), parole supervision 
for life, and possible future commitment as a sexually violent 
offender.”344 The trial courts generally review these forms with 
the defendant during the guilty plea, to ensure “that the defen-
dant clearly understands what he is getting into.”345 
The myriad other issues of implementation that such a 
constitutionally based, judicial oversight function raises are 
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the crimi-
nal justice system, which has proven its capacity to absorb and 
adapt to many new rules of constitutional criminal procedure, 
would similarly adapt over time to a rule of reasonable warn-
ings about certain or severe consequences of criminal convic-
tions.346 
 
 343. E-mail from James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 
New Jersey State Office of the Public Defender, Appellate Section, to Author 
(June 12, 2008 2:16 PM) (on file with author). 
 344. Id.; see also RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
COURTS, CRIMINAL—PLEA FORMS AND JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION, N.J. DI-
RECTIVE #4-02 (2002), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/ 
criminal/dir_04_02.pdf (describing various plea forms, including “Supplemen-
tal Plea Form for Sexual Offenses”);  RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, CRIMINAL – REVISED AND NEW PLEA FORMS, N.J. 
DIRECTIVE #15-01 (2001), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ 
directive15.pdf (describing a New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 
directive that, in the wake of state supreme court decisions, courts modify 
their plea forms to advise defendants of No Early Release Act ramifications of 
their guilty plea). 
 345. Smith, supra note 343 (“There are still a few cases where defendants 
may have a valid claim that they were not validly warned of the consequences 
of their plea, but not many.”). 
 346. See Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating 
Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1090 (2004). (“Adding collateral consequences to 
[the] mix [of a defense attorney’s counseling functions] is not likely to pose 
significant additional burdens, particularly as attorneys would soon develop 
an internal database of these consequences, which would allow them to quick-
ly summon those consequences that are relevant to the particular case.”). This 
same general concept would apply to judges, albeit in a somewhat different 
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The Due Process Clause and the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel are intended to protect individual defendants, 
not the smooth operation of the system that accepts so many 
guilty pleas. Even if finality and efficiency are legitimate con-
cerns in the criminal justice system, they are not of constitu-
tional dimension. These values cannot trump the protections 
for guilty pleas, which speak to individual rights. 
  CONCLUSION   
The current collateral-consequences rule rests on doctrinal-
ly flawed ground, is outdated, and is simply bad theory and pol-
icy. The fact that a defendant can plead guilty to a sexual (or 
even, in some states, a nonsexual) offense without knowing 
that the resulting conviction is a critical step toward involunta-
ry commitment under an SVPA starkly illustrates the problems 
with the current rule. 
In an era where many nonpenal consequences are anything 
but “collateral” to a defendant, and where they may in fact 
dwarf the criminal sanction, it is time to debunk the myth of 
the direct-collateral divide and revisit a defendant’s right to in-
formation in the guilty plea process. A rule of reasonableness 
for preplea warnings offers this, and brings the defendant’s 
missing perspective back into the guilty plea process. This 
would begin a move towards more transparency and rationality 
in the guilty plea process. 
 
manner given their differing relationship with a defendant. But see Julian A. 
Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading 
of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863 (2004). Cook observes: 
Given the high degree of dependency on the part of the judiciary, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys upon the current plea structure, 
there exists a strong disincentive to permit any substantive changes 
to the system that might diminish its efficiency. Underlying this re-
frain is a need by each of the principal participants to maximize 
scarce resources and/or achieve certain economic benefits. Private de-
fense attorneys, compromised by low compensation for indigent re-
presentation, and public defenders, pressured by excessive caseloads, 
inadequate resources, and internal office concerns, benefit from a sys-
tem that encourages out-of-court dispositions. Prosecutors and the ju-
diciary are similarly subjected to excessive caseloads and therefore 
also benefit under a structure that mitigates such pressures. 
Id. at 899–900. 
